00117
ERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
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personal use of
TO
THE
Toa Uthalmer
Copy No..
66
65
aft
CO 537/1261
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
restrictions Further Information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National
e that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
OF STAFF COMMITTEE
T PLANNING STAFF
GARISON OF HONG KONG
t by the Joint Planning Staff
ation of instructions we have examined ɔm S.A.C.S.E. A. in which he forwards
the garrison of liong Kong expressed by efence Committee.
Licy
Defence Committee's present agreed
d to the defence of Hong Kong is briefly
the Colony could not be defended
it attack by a major power in
ition of the Chinese mainland,
long should be reçṛrded as an
nded port as far as fixed defences ncerned.
tre internal security, 28 a
tion against piracy, and as a
'ent to an attempt at incursion by e pucrillas, forces of the order
brigado and half a flying boat
'on vould be required in the Colony
›me considerable time, units of the ih Prcific Fleet providing such neval co-operation in those tasks
be required.
sont Amy garrison of two brigades
I be reduced to one brigade
ly the re-establishment of the
Police Force permitted.
The
of Staff informed C.-in-C.,
on, that they understood this
ion would be likely to be about nuary, 1947.
308 747 and 762.
(4) 7th Mooting.
403, antod 3rd April.
00118
N
Ref.:
CO 537/1261
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet.
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
3.
LONG TERM PROBLEM
The South East Asia Defence Committoo at a meeting on 30th August, 1946, considered the views of the Governor of Hong Kong on the extent of the garrison of that colony. Their conclusions were that since considerable quantities of modern arms had buen supplied to China by both the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. and much equipment had been left behind in the country by the Japanese, the assumption made by the C.-in-C., Hong Kong, in his appreciation, that an attacking army would be adequately equipped still held good.
They therefore considered that, to act as a deterrent, a garrison of one British brigade and ono field artillery regiment would be required permanently in the Colony, with another brigade group available within S.E.A.C. and capable of being; rapidly transported to liong Kong in emergency.
4.
It had previously been suggested by the War Office, that it would be undesirable to tie up permanently regular Sritish troops in Hong Kong and thet e gendarmeric capable of ensuring the internal security of the Colony rnd deterring: uorilla incursions should be raised to take their place. While it is probable that ultimately a force of this nature will be adequate, we agree with SACSDA that under present conditions it would be insufficient.
5.
Furthermore it has been represented by SACSEA that Indian troops, assuming Indin were willing to supply them, would be unsatisfactory as the sole garrison of the Colony. Wo agroo with this view.
6.
In view therefore of the abovu, and of the prostige vrluc of British forces in this important commercial port, we consider that it should be accepted in principle that the garrison of the Colony, the strength of which has already been approved as of the order of one brigade, should consist of a British formation as recommended by the Governor of Hong Kong and the S. E. Asia Defence Committee. Thin British force would be required until the gendermarie was capable of onsuring the security of the colony having regard to conditions existing in China at the time. Thereafter, the garrison duties would be undertaken solely by the gendarmerie. At all times it would be desirable to have a brigade group in reserve available at call within S.E, A. C.
7.
In view of the pressing need for economy in the use of British forces, it would be advisable for the War Office and Colonial Office to continue discussion of the formation of a rondarmerie. However, owing to the difficulty of forecastin when it will be possible to dispense with the British garrison we feel it may not be possible for the Colonial Öffice to proceed beyond the extent of preparing plans which might include, amongst other items, preparation of establishments and training syllabii and consideration of conditions of service.
+ SEACOS 747
* 0.0.3. (46) 193(0).
→ SEACOS 714, 19th June, 1946.
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