00095

CO 537/1261

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

N

restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives'

a nola that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

leaflet.

that alta might be such a station and the

xchanging the garrison there with the

has therefore been uxaninod.

ination has shown that there would be no istrative difficulties consoquent on the present Army Garrison of Malta being, fantry battalions, is of approximately the 33 Commando Brigade, and thus would, with t, be an adequate garrison for Hong Kong. indo training, the G.0. C. lialta has forwarded accrning present gurrison dutios in Malta.

ovident also that adequate training periods Lc for the Commandos: In view of the above we he proposed exchange is the best solution and

should be medo LB soon as is practicablo.

of L:,nding Craft. The South East Asia Defence lors that unless landing craft for a battalion blo at Hong Kong the minimum requirements for the colony will not be met and strongly supports

the Governor that six L. C. Ts. and six L. C. I. (L)s ned and .intained. These craft are not

Post-War ..ssault Force and can only be

1 expuns of other approved commitments.

ro, however, loase lund craft and will have to the U. S. Authorities.

Afrin'ements

roviously been sugested by the War Offico,

undusirable to tie un permanently, regular

in Hong Kong and that ndarmerie capable

internal security of the Colony and

11 incursions should eventually be raised Lace. This suggestion has never been

or considered by the Hong Kong Goverment, rence Committee, or the British Defence

ath East ..810. The Colonial Office, however,

is impossible to forusu how the political

Velop in China, or to estimato whon it may iiscount the threat of large scalu attack on th. Chinese mainland, that the proposal to

or Fundarmoric to replace the British garrison

at a practical issue, They consider, therefore, ons on this project now would serve no useful

ust point out, howovur, that our acute man-power iospread cormitunts might necessitate the von the reduced garrison of Hong Kong, perhaps

if it is considered that risks clsewhere those in the Colony.

of the above it would be provident to consider

ns for the oventual formation of a gendarmerie

of nucleus force as soon as possiblo.

C.0.3. (46) 147th Mouting

Appendix

SEX.COS 747, and 762

4.1. (1)259

C. C. 3. (46)193(0)

13031/4/46 Fart II dated 9th October, 1946.

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00096

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cms

Ref.:

CO 537/1261

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

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restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet

Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright

The advantaĻus of establishing such a nucleus would be :-

13.

(a) to allow a quick build of the complote force

in emergency;

(b) to afford opportunity of training with the

present military garrison;

(c) make up any deficiency consequent on the exchange of 3 Commando Brigade with the battalions from Malta,

We consider therefore that the War Office should open discussions with the Colonial Cffice with a view to the establishment as soon as possible of a nuclous gondarmeric. At the same time the views of the South East Asia Defence Committoo and of the Hong Kong Governant and Defence Committee, on this matter, should be sought.

Conclusions

13.

Wo conclude that:-

(a) Thu strength of the garrison of Hong Kong should

rein unaltered until the local police and volunteer forces are officicnt, which it is expected will be by April.

(b) 3 Commando Brigadu should be exchanged as soon

8 is practicable with ray units ct present in Malta, thereby mnking available two infantry battalions which, together with a field regiment, shoul for the ritish rrison of Hong Kong after ril, 1947. The field regiment should be provided by 5. 1. C. 3. d. A who should also otrmark an infantry brigado ng a Pusorve at call within. 3. 3... C.

(c) is it is hoped that the eventual garrison of Hong long will bu a gunŭarnurie, and since commitments may necessitnto tho withdrawal at short notice of the military garrison, it would be provident to consider now the establishment of nucleus force as soon as possible. (a) The landing craft required for Hong Kong can only be

maintained at the expense of other approved commitments.

Recommendations

14.

We recommend that:-

(a) The War Office is invited to open discussions with the Colonial Office retrain; the ostablishment, 8 3000 B possible, of a nucleus end::rmorio,

(b) The Ar Cvice is invited to arrange with the

Whirlty nd Combined Operations Headquarters for the exchange, as soon as practicable, of

3 Comando neigaãe with the two battalions at prosent in alto.

(c) The telegram t Annex is despatched to S. . C. S. E. A.

Offices of the Cabinet and

Minister of Defence, S.V.1.

28TH OCTOBER, 1946.

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