2.
EFINICE PLAN
PLN
003 10
TOP SECRET
or the air defence of Hong Kong is based
e next five years the likely strength
not exceed two or three divisions of
ould be provided by a wasting air force
in the air aspect of the defence of
tance of reducing enemy air attack to its a congosted and vulnerable target
well cause considerable material damage or. ivilian moralo.
ack on the Colony which it is considered
o which the strength of a defensive
is very minute as compared with recent may well be that an opposing air force
win-engined bomber force supplemented by he bomber force may be supported by ahawk type, ir addition to which there sployment against us in the early ters of the ustang type.
ove it may appear that it is possible
odern air force equipped with efficient
which should be taken into account
of such an air foras. These factors
cability.
by unskilled and badly trained ground
rew and controllers,
By operated airfield facilities.
and equipment backing.
the above factors, it is considered that
will be excessive. Operational aintainance and bad flying coupled ccount for as many aircraft as will be
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Condillons of supply of National Archives' leaflet
se note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of st may be subject to copyrigh
•
I
00371
6.
-13
The ability of the enemy to operate by night may be assessed as very low, It is doubtful whether the standard of crow training can produce any crows capable of finding liong Kong at night and returning safely to their basos in the dark. Operations of this nature can hardly be sustained in the light of indifferent aids and poor airfield facilities available to the entry. Moonlight nights will bo of considerable assistance to then in this ruspoat, one must balance against this, however, the advanta o can'erred on the night fightor by noonlight conditions.
7.
It is considered, Errefore, in the light of the above factors thiet the scale of enony ir attack in Hong Kong will probably, in the initial stages, consist of mixed bober formations of 30 to 40 rircraft escorted by 12 to 15 mixed fightons. The fighting ability of this force is ašsosued as law i, ruäntion to the indiferent sidill rnd experience of the aircrews me on'rollers, There will, however, always be the excption ul votat count upon a mucleus of courageous ami зkilful pilots cal crows. It is considered unlikely that such a scale of attrok can be sustill. Tigh operational and non-operational casualtics vill quickly reduce the ex. ort to a stage where the onery vill havo to docião vhother to c
sneak and wu raids by anil forations or single aircraft sy day or to resort to night babing. loither of tiuse posribilities ofur hinsch more than a nuisance valuo and both can be vell takın care if by a susll end efficient fighter force with a nom.l operaticnal broling.
3.
There is, however, one Pinal problem which is difficult to AS! (98. It is considered that my calculations of the strongth and ofijalency of an opposing air foru: si muld take into account the Dossibility o" an orcrgetic ve. 1 7 Paling st, on to supplerent his air Taranu with aqudyry nù antriowbou ajor wor, either on a fiuncial or other basin. Ta vision, demorilized and disgruntled young cirovevs of any nationalityy ohsily be topted by love of adventure coupled with a practise of high omoluzonts, Soldiers of fortune of this category aro ayubio of introducing an clownt of lealership, skall and courage into an niy foron of poor quality. problem of outside support camot be taken care of in its entireity but as an insuranco, it is considered that defensive air forcos in Hong Kong should be designed to be eli htly stronger than is necessary For defence a minst local air forces.
STRENGTH OF ON: FORCES.
9.
In order to provide reasonablo security against the
This
situation outlined in the abovo part.graphs, it is considered that the following casures for defence are essential:-
An officient and modern fighter forco.
Efficient Radar cover.
Fighter operations room, filter room and G. C. I. facilities to control the fighter force. Anti-aircraft dofono.
Facilitics for air lirt.
A reinforcement plan.
سا
Please note that this co
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet.
y is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh