00254
ph 2(c) and (d). Our estimate of
r Hong Kong is one Brigade.
It is
n less one Brigade will be stationed
11 1949. One of these brigades would einforcement for you in the event of kely.
all Naval requirements can be met from
, of local defence flotillas and
ing craft once waters of colony have
nes are not considered necessary.
t Hong Kong is part of total allocated
>osed between Burma, Malaya and
Le
We do not consider increase in
East is justified. Request your
ving your requirements.
re secking Treasury approval to
Iong Kong Volunteer Forces.
of Cabinet approval for garrison of
long, you should use this as a
awing up plans for re-building necessary
-14-
| 2
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet.
note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
00255
Extract from note on Colonial Military Forces
in the Second World War.
فی
Ref:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
Please note that this further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet
I subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copynghit
restrictions
*
106.
XV.
*
HONG KONG.
*
The Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Force. In Hong Kong as in Ceylon and Malaya, a Volunteer force with a small permanent staff had been established long before the war. This was the Hong Kong Volunteer Defence Corps, which at the end of 1938 was 1,175 strong. It included British, Portuguese
On the outbreak of war the Eurasians, Chinese and Indians. numbers and the amount of time devoted to training increased, and by June, 1941, the force was 2,400 strong. Colonel H. B. Rose, M.Č., the commandant, in his report on the force for 1940-1, said that owing to other calls on European manpower no further expansion of the European element in the Force was possible, and also that it was difficult to obtain Chinese recruits. Many of the Chinese could not get away for training and preferred A.R.P. work to service with the Volunteers.
107. Training.
Training in the last year before the Japanese attack consisted of two weeks in camp, a half-day parade a week, one or two evening parades a week, week-end manning exercises and musketry or special parades on Sundays. The corps comprised machine-gun companies, artillery, an
The corps was enginer company, signals and other units. considered keen and efficient, its weapon training most satisfactory but its tactical training rather less 80. regular units in Hong Kong assisted the Volunteers' training and relations between them were good.
The
108. We have no detailed account of the Volunteers' part in the sixteen days fighting before Hong Kong fell, but we have also had no criticism of the Force. There was a far clearer case for a Volunteer Force in Hong Kong, where most of the Europeans were engaged in commercial activities which would cease in time of siege, than in Malaya where many of the European population were engaged in planting or mining enter-
The prises which were producing materials necessary for war. only serious criticism of the Hong Kong Volunteers was that - like the rest of the Hong Kong Garrison, there were not enough of them.
*
*E
*
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