00250
an assault force, we do justified in mounting an tory, no matter how serious
e situation, unless Hong Kong
13 unlikely that we should
reserves for such an
ore, consider that the
required at Hong Kong.
ar to be a requirement to
of the Colony itself in
ce and to ensure internal
paragraph 3 above, 6 L.S.TS
Kong in Care and
then required.
previous view that the
should be one brigade.
› can take over the internal
will be adequate to carry
ers that, should a minor
, the scale of enemy air
ial stages, consist of
0 440 bombers
escorted by
in unlikely that this
L.
The fighting ability
ity against the situation
onsiders that the following .al :-
. fighter force consisting
uadron with
bodied.
hwin-engined
ral Reconnaissance
rcraft for
ir sea rescue and
ties.
•
filter room and
CO 537/1260
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00251
1 2
cms
Ref.
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
restrictions Further information is given in
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Coment
10. As we have seen from the J.I.C. report, the air attack which C.-in-C. Hong Kong envisages is only likely in the event of open hostilities breaking out with the Central Government. Providing, therefore, that air reinforcements are available for Hong Kong, we do not consider that there is justification for the size of air forces which the C.-in-C. recommends.
In our "Review of Service Commitment between 1947 and 1951", the following squadrons have been allocated
.to the Far East, at present under the command of A.C.S.E.A. :-
3 Ground Attack Squadrons
1 Light Bomber Squadron
2 Coastal Strike Squadrons
2 Transport Squadrons;
1 P.R. Squadron.
and
These forces will be disposed between Burma, Malaya and Hong Kong. It will be necessary, therefore, for C.-in-C., Hong Kong, to approach A.C.8.E.A. giving his requirements.
We adhere to our views expressed in J.P. (45) 277 and do not consider that Admiral Harcourt has made out a sufficiently strong case to justify an increase in the overall air strength of the Far Eastern theatre.
This
in
11. The proposed radar lay-out in Hong Kong uses equipment either held or allocated to the colony.
It is anticipated is drawn from A.C.S.E.A. 's resources. that new up-to-date equipment will supersede that now use, and A.C.S.E.A. has been requested to bear this in mind when siting his existing sets to avoid having to re- site the new typos. C.-in-C., Hong Kong's plan does not state whether this point has in fact been considered when preparing his appreciation.
We consider that the other detailed points raised by C.-in-C., Hong Kong, in his Air Plan should be examined by the Defence of Pases Committee. Intelligence Organisation
12. C.-in-C., Hong Kong, recommends that a Joint Intelligence Committee, including civil representation, be maintained; the services of reliable agents for reporting from the mainland are considered essential.
If we are to keep the garrison down to the minimum
we shall require an official intelligence organisation in order that we may get the earliest possible "arning of
The J.1.C., in their report (Annex I impending trouble. paragraph 12), also agree with this course, and recommend that close liaison should be maintained with H.. Embassy
in China.
We therefore endorse C.-in-C's recommendation to establish a Joint Intelligence Centre at Hong Kong.
Volunteer Force
13.
C.-in-C. requests for approval in principle to the re-forming of volunteer forces.
We are in agreement with this since it is the most economical method of providing a reserve in the event of minor disturbances.
+ J.P. (45) 277
x Air Ministry letter C.28071/45
eted. 30th October, 1945.
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