002 17
would be readily available
should this be called for.
has alredy been tuken to
in reserve at Hong Kong.
ired (see port. 11 below).
ze that 16 H.D. M. L. wil bo
ore patrols, to prevent the
> smuggling of arms into the
o force can take over.
ision of mine aweupers cannot
W of the J.I.C. estimate
hostilities break out with the
nl that the likelihood of this
note as to bo nugligible.
mineswoopers at Hong Kong,
ver, be considered when
The
boen complcted in the Far East.
imates the land forces required t.de disposed as follows:-
One rijade Group plus
Div. Ruccc. and Div. M. G. battalion
One Brig do Group less
one battalion
Two Battalions (including
Divisional Defence Battalion)
e is a requirement for an assault
nor sea-borne expedition to the
serious deterioration of the
CO 537/1260
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Please note that this copy is supplied subject la the National Archives' larms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
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two brigos at the present been provided primarily for Kong Police Force is not yet lonial Office have stated
pust regarded the recruiting
L'orcements to the European
a mtter of urgency and
n taken to this end.
rce has been brought up to an
cnsider that the tasks given in rried out by a force of leas nsider force of this size will ainst the aspirations of locr:1 Jar hould take up the question of the pporting rms for this brigade
1 of an assault force, we do not
led upon to mount an operation
5) 694 (0)
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1
002 18
of any size against Chinese territory, no matter how serious the deterioration in the Chinese situation. We do not, therefore, consider that the provision of a brigade lift is required at Hong Kong.
Ther would, however, appear to be a requirement to land anall forces on the islands of the Colony itself in order to maintain a show of force and to ensure internal security 6 L.C.T. and 6 L.C.I.(L) wijl be at Hong Kong in Care and liaintenance, and could be used wren requiend.
Air Forces
12.
The C.-in-C., Hong Kong, considers that the following measures for air defence are essential;-
(a) Air forces consisting of:-
(1) 1 S.E. Fighter Squadron with
F.R. element embodied.
(11) detachment of 3 Twin-engined
Night Fighters.
(111) A Long Range General Reconnaissance
Dquadron.
(iv) Detachments of aircraft for
meteorological, air sea rescue and communication duties.
(b) Efficient radar cover.
(c) Fighter operations room, filter room and
G.C.I. facilities.
(d) nti-aircraft defence.
(e) Facilities for air lift.
(f) A reinforcement plan.
Comment
13. C.-in-C., Hong Kong's recommendations are based on the assumption that enemy air attacks might be made by mixed formations of low fighting ability, consisting of 30 to 40 bomburs escorted by 12 to 15 mixed fighters. Annex I shows
We do that this scale of attack is unlikely to materialise. not, therefore, consider that there is justification for the size of air forces which the C.-in-C. recommends.
We consider th.t n dutchment of half a flying boat squadron should be sufficient to carry out anti-piracy
trols and to provide the nir garrison.
14. C.-in-C. Hong Kong envisages the possible need for supply and reinforcement by nir. We do not consider that the probable scale of attack is likely to prevent normal supply and reinforcement by sea, although difficulties might arise from organized strikes, and disorganization of local dock labour. We do not, therefore, consider that any special measures for air supply are necessary over and above the normal air transport services.
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-
N
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
2
a note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
restrictions. Further information
is given in the enclosed "Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet