002 12
reviewed at
.cn and our
in-C.,
-C. Hong Kong's
38.
We consider,
the LSI (M) are'
rmanent garrison
ing boat
nent air
Intelligence
La bo
es including
ld be formed
D invited
commodation
sunt to
ild also
this paper.
30 should
scale of
Hong Kong over
ars, taking
lonial Office
10 necessary
maintain forces
JVC
note that this c
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
CO 537/1260
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives (eaflet
y is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
ANNEX I
[J. 1. C. (46) 7 (0) (Revised Fincl)
7TH IDIUARY, 1946.
J
HONG KONG FENCE PLAN
002 13
Report by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee We have been asked by the Joint Planning Staff to examine Section. II and III o an appreciation by the Commandor-in-Chief, Hong Kong, on the Defence of Hong Kong, with a view to assessing the potential threat to Hong and commenting on the necessity for an intelligence organisation included in the Commander-in-Chief, Hong recor..ondations. Our remarks are as follow-
Kong,
Kong's
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
2
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet. Please note that the copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
2.
It is considered that, at present, no nation except China is likely to undertake to wrest Hong Kong from British
The possibility of a major war between China and hand.. Great Erit in in the next ten years is so remote as to be negligible. In any other attempt to recover the Colony
+
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.. might give China diplomatic support.
3.
The Chinese are singularly inept at mounting an attack
nd, in fact, have never scored a major success in the course of their eight years wr with Japan.
FORCES AVAILABLE
ܢܳܐ
The fighting forces at Chinc's disposal are estimated
to be briefly an follows:-
(a) Nevy
The Chinese navy hu never been, and is never likely to be, an officient fighting force.
(b) Army
The most efficient troops in the present day
Chinese Army aro those trained and equipped by the Americans. They amount to approximately twenty divisions and number about 390,000 personnel. They equipped with infantry weapons and also with field and medium artillery. The efficiency of the artillery personnel is not of a high standard. Some captured Japanose A. F.Vs may be available but a co- ordinated attack by armoured formations is unlikely. Air support has not been developed
-5-