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CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
our use of it be subject to copynghi
Please note thestrictions Further formation is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Amay be unter
N
(a) A direct land assault by c Chinese cry of up
to 75,000 men, lod by a Southorn War Lord is notontial threat.
(e) Piracy on loc 1 shipping is c. possibility at
cll times.
(f) guorille cray night march on Hong Kong na
the result of internal unrost or civil war in China.
Summary of Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee Report
e attach at innox I report by the J. I. C. which they examino Sections find III of the C.-in-cs appreciation. Lhose sections cover potential onomy forces available to attiek Hong Kong, and the possible formas of attack open to the onery.
The J. I. C. hive casunud in making thidir report that some form of grison would be maintained at Hong Kong. They consider that if no such garrison were maintained, the potential throat would be increased. Thoir report shows that :-
(a) The J. I. C. agree with C.-in-C., Hong Kong regarding
Chinchu Lapirations, There are indications, however, tint the chinese will not confine themselves to purely diplomatic means in bringing pressure to bear for the recovery of Hong Kong.
(b) A direct land assault on the New Territories,
coupled with ineffective cir raids on port or military installations (which might have same effect on civilian morale) and limited mining from junks is only likely in the future if open hostilities break out with the Central Govorment. The possibility of this within the next ten yours is so remote as to be negligible.
(c) Modern arms and equipment, including aircraft and transport, would not in all probability
vailable to a Frovincial War Lord, should
be
one rise in S. China to challenge the rule of Chiang Kai-Shok. In any case the possibility of direct attack by a Provincial War Lord can also be excluded.
(d) The most likely form of attack is by infiltration
of a large number of agents into the Chinese populatio to organiso strikes, civil unrest and boycott. This might well be carried out in conjunction with the interruption of food and other sulics to the Colony from China, to lend weight to the political campaign for recovery of Hong Kong.
(e) The movemento of Chinese to and from Hong Kong
cannot be controlled; arms up to and including L.M.G. and small mortars can be smuggled into the Colony in ler o quantities.
-2-
า
Ref:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives
restrictions. Further information is
given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet. s and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
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