00173
sion of mine sweepers
in view of the J.I.cl ikely if hostilities
Grnment of China and that
next 10 years is so
The question of laying up
ong, as an insurance
whón mine clearance
in the Far East.
ARMY
ntes the land forces
one brigade disposed as
One Brigade Group plus
Div. Recce, and Div.
M.G. battalion
One Brigade Group less
one battalion
Two Battalions (including
Divisional Defence
Battalion)
is a requirement for an
for a minor seaborne
in the event of a serious
situation.
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVÉS
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leafel
i note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' lerms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
nts are based on his
ed to meet a threatened
with a force of 75,000 men.
sists of two brigades; the ded primarily for police lice Force is not yet of nial Office have stated that
t regarded the recruiting and
ements to the European
a matter of urgency and
ng taken to this end.
ion is presumably based on
requirements of the ground
of a potential attacker.
on the forces required
.ons with the J.I.C. lead
by a Chinese War Lord is
re is a garrison of the
as a deterrent.
rld wide commitments and
; recommend that the garrison
gade Jirectly the re-establishment
which should be possible in
that the army garrison required
ed in paragraph 10 of the Paper
arrison of two brigades
de
eductions depending on the internal .on in China.
00174
Ref.:
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
7
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet.
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigh
11. Regarding the provision of an assault force, we do not consider that we shall be called upon to mount an operation of any size against Chinese territory, no matter how serious the deterioration in the Chinese situation. Wo do not, therefore, consider that the provision of a brigade lift is required at Hong Kong.
There might, however be a requirement for landing small forces on the islands of the Colony itself to unsure internal security. Certain landing craft (see paragraph 6 above) will be at Hong Kong in Caro and Maintenance, and could be used when required.
AIR FORCES
12. The C.-in-C. Hong Kong, considers that the following measures for air defence are cosential:-
(a) Air forces consisting of:-
(i) 1 S. E. Fighter Squadron with
P. R. element embodied.
(ii) A detachment of 3 Twin-engined
Night Fighters.
(iii) A Long Range General Reconnaissance
Squadron
(iv) Detachments of aircraft for meteorological,
air sea rescue and communication dutics.
(b) Efficient radar cover.
(c) Fightur operations room, filter room and
G. C. I. facilities.
(d) Anti-aircraft defence.
(e) Facilities for air lift
(f) A reinforcement plan
Comment
13.
C.-in-C. Hong Kong's recommendations are based on the assumption that unemy air.attacks might bu made by mixed formations of low fighting ability, consisting of 30 to 40 bombers escorted by 12 to 15 mixed fighters. Annox I shows that this scule of attack is unlikely to materialise. We do not, therefore, consider that there is justification for the size of air forces which the C.-in-C. recommends.
We consider that a detachment of half a flying boat squadron should be sufficient to carry out anti- piracy patrols and to provide the air garrison. Reinforcements if required will bo drawn from clsewhere in the theatre.
14.
C.-in-C. Hong Kong envisages the possible need
We do not consider for supply and reinforcement by air. that the probable scale of attack is likely to prevent normal supply and reinforcement by sea, although difficulties might arise from organised strikes, and
We do not, disorganisation of local dock labour. therefore, consider that any special measures for air supply ar necessary over and above the normal air transport services.
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