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CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
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restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leafel
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00173
CO 537/1260
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
se note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyrigi
restrictions.
Further information is given in the enclosed
Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet
8. Mine sweeping. The provision of mine sweepers cannot be considered essential in view of the J.I.Cl estimate that mining is only likely if hostilities break out with the Central Government of China and that the likelihood of this in the noxt 10 years is 80
The question of laying up remote as to be negligible. reserve minesweepers at Hong Kong, as an insurance, should, however, be considered when mine clearance operations have been completed in the Far East.
ARMY
9. C.-in-C. Hong Kong, estimates the land forces required as one division loss one brigade disposed as follows:-
Control of Frontier
and New Territories
Kowloon
Hong Kong Island
One Brigado Group plus
Div. Recce. and Div. M.G. battalion
One Erigade Group less
one battalion
Two Battalions (including
Divisional Defence Battalion)
He also states that there is a requirement for an assault lift for one brigade for a minor seaborne expedition to the China Coast in the event of a serious deterioration of the Chinese situation.
Comment
10. The C.-in-C.'s requirements are based on his appreciation of forces required to meet a threatened attack by a Chinese ar Lord with a force of 75,000
men.
The present garrison consists of two brigades; the Becond brigade has been provided primarily for police duties since the Hong Kong Police Force is not yet of
The Colonial Office have stated that adequate strength. they have for a long time past regarded the_recruiting and despatch of adequate reinforcements to the European Police Force in Hong Kong as a matter of urgency and importance, and stops are being taken to this end.
The C.-in-C. 's appreciation is presumably based on a combination of the tactical requirements of the ground and the strength and armament of a potential attacker. We cannot question his views on the forces required tactically but our consultations with tho J.1.C. lead us to the view that an attack by a Chinese War Lord is exceedingly improbable if there is a garrison of the nature of a brigade in being as a deterrent.
Having regard to our world wide commitments and overall shortage of troops we recommend that the garrison should be reduced to one brigade directly the re-establishment of the Police Force permits, which should be possible in the fairly near future.
To sum up, we consider that the army garrison required for the three Phases mentioned in paragraph 10 of the Paper are as follows:-
Phase I
Phase II
Phase III
-
Present garrison of two brigades
One brigade
Further reductions depending on the internal
situation in China.
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