00056
00057
-
2
cms
Ref.:
CO 537/1649
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
N
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
Archives' leaflet.
e what grounds other
be advanced in favour
t would clearly be
entiate, on those
to the return of Hong reign governments to which once belonged lina'
e claim in this
ite pressure from those
in it a readiness on ment to entertain
it factors to be
.s alternative are
especting the future
en in the past, and
indicated that we were up sovereignty we
secure the conditions
In other words, it cceptance of the
subject of conditions, is the possibility
on those conditions
America and elsewhere.
offer to review the the lines suggested
with the second
danger of (1) giving
of other British ing the Chinese ncessions in the
usual technique.
the line we would
·
negotiations being
It would probably erstanding with the
pened (a) that the
e New Territories would
(b) that any agreement cussions should be
of the so-called
leave the Chinese to he matter, the nature the timing of the
se Government to raise t would seem preferable
isting instability of ny discussion of the
s Majesty's Government
time. If, however, heir initiative until settled, we should
ilar to that indicated ilised that such an
/offer
2
Ref.:
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
CO 537/1649
restrictions. Further information is given in the enclosed Terms and Conditions of supply of National Archives' leaflet.
Please note that this copy is supplied subject to the National Archives' terms and conditions and that your use of it may be subject to copyright
offer would probably fall far short of the Chinese demanda. Were the Chinese, however, to press for a wider settlement and at the same time to make a positive attempt to undermine our position in the Colony either by subversive action or by open boycott, we should then be faced with the necessity of deciding whether to maintain our attitude, regardless of the consequences, or to recede from our position and to make, as a matter of political expediency, an offer to transfer sovereignty in return for a lease on suitable terms.
Conclusion
13. Our conclusion is that although the arguments for and against our taking the initiative are finely balanced and there may be tempting advantages to be gained from adopting the first course, it would be wiser on the whole to refrain from taking the initiative and offering to open with the Chinese Government the discussions on the leased territories contemplated in 1943. We feel however that, in
order to lessen the uncertainty regarding the future of Hong Kong which we understand exists in business circles, it would be very desirable for some reassurance to be given in a public statement that we intend to retain Hong Kong.
29th November, 1946.
Foreign Office
Colonial Office
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