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Moreover,
itionis not well taken. In the first place, the defendant was not
compelled to pay under threats of death by any order of the Japanese.
The Administrative Order (Exhibit C) only provided for the liquidation
of banks, among which was the plaintiff Bank, and set forth the instruc-
tions as to how such liquidation should be carried out; and Order No. 1
(Exhibit B) threatened with death those debtos who did not pay their debts
on the pretext that in the near future a moratorium order would be issued,
but not any debtor who merely failed to pay his debt. Certainly the
defendant was not among those first mentioned.
it could allow
the foreclosure of its mortgage without prejudice to contesting, in due time, the legality of such foreclosure, since all that was required of it was the payment of its debt or, upon default, the foreclosure of the security. The defendant should not have lost sight of the illegality of
the acts of the invader concerning the sequestration and disposition of
the credit in question, either under the known laws of the country or
under International Law. In the second place, the cases of Bishop of
Jaro vs. De la Peha and Mandeville vs. Bank of Louisiana have no similarity
with the case at bar. In those cases, what were confiscated were funds
deposited in the Banks, whereas in this case the thing that was confis-
cated was a credit which was collected with the knowledge and consent of
the debtor, but without the consent of the creditor, and the payment was made with currency different from that loaned and which was not legal tender under the laws of the country. Judging from the little value of
the money with which the credit was paid, it might even be said that the
defendant made the payment fem its own pecuniary advantage. As for
the rest, in the case of De la Peha, as was seen in the later case in- stituted by his heirs (43 Phil. 430), there was no clear evidence that the funds in question, confiscated by the American military forces, did not belong to the insurgents and that the military forces did not have the authority to confiscate them so as to have their act of confiscation considered as a real force majeure. It is known that the United States had, by law, authority to confiscate property of the insurgents who rose against its government, In the case of Mandeville v. Bank of Louisiana
for
on the other hand, it has been Been that the real issue, as was stated by the Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case of Nelligan v. Citizens