The largest British stakes in the extreme Far East have been concentrated in Shanghai and in Hongkong. Shanghai was never a British possession. It owed its development from a mosquito infested swamp to foreign (especially Anglo- American) municipal control. Only within the past two decades have the Chinese seriously attempted to improve the surrounding areas which were under their unfettered jurisdiction. In its general administration, policing, sanitation, public utilities, and immunity from the effects of Chinese internal
isturbances, the International Settlement of Shanghai was decades ahead of any Chinese city. Under treaties with China signed by the British and American Governments in January 1943, the municipal control of Shanghai, together with
Even the most Jurisdiction over their respective nationals, reverts to China. optimistic of China's friends must realize that in organizing a local administration for Shanghai, in any way comparable with that of the International regime, the Chinese Government will face a stupendous task--one, in fact, which may prove beyond its capacity unless a foreign element is retained in the Council,
Efficient acministration has not the Police Force, and the Municipal Services.
been a strong point among the Chinese in the past, and with the reversion to Chinese control of manchuria, Formosa, the Japanese occupied territories, and the former Foreign Municipalities at Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow, and Shameen, General Chiang's Government is likely to find its administrative capacity put to u severe test. It is unreasonable to suggest that before raising the issue of Hongkong--which will automatically come up when the lease of the New Territories expires in 1907--China should demonstrate her ability to shoulder, satisfactorily, her new responsibilities in the areas which come under her unfettered control?
British interests and investments in Hongkong are of sufiicient importance to justify extreme clution in considering any change in the Colony's status.
It is true. that with its There is also the strategic factor to be considered. present area (including the Lease Territory) of 390 square miles, Hongkong
But if, as is understood, could never we developed into an impregnabio fortress. America will establish bass in the Ayukus and possibly also Formosa, on the Eastern siac of the China Seas, and Russia establishes a naval pase at Port Arthur; Hongkong, which commands the Western passage into the South China Sea and Formosa Strait, might well become an important air and naval ouse without. refortiiication. Unless one assumes that the Allied Governments will become somiolent after a few years, one can hardly imagine the possibility of Japan's The Allied buses igain attacking Hongkong or Corregidor with invasion forces. in the Pacific may reasonably be regarded as springboards from which to short- And unless one subscribes circuit any future attempts at Japanese aggression. to the idea that America and hussia are to monopolize precautionary measures for the preservation of Far Eastern peace, there can be no good reason for discriminating against Hongkong.
Finally, no one can deny that the future prosperity of Hongkong--as its
There is no reason pust prosperity--must depend upon Anglo-Chinese co-operation.
to doubt that this will be forthcoming when China, huving got over the flurry of sudden victory, realizes, and settles down to, the stupendous tasks of rehabilitation and industrialization. During that process a free port, controlled by a friendly Power, may well prove to be an asset, rather than a grievance.
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fransmitted by
British Overseas Press Service,
30 Rockefeller Plaza,
New York <0, 1.Y.
September 18, 1945.