148
25th August, 1945. 39
Top Secret
tem Ismans
36
Thank you for your letter of yesterday about the arrangements for accepting a Japanese surrender at long Yong.
s I expect you will have heard, Mr. Bevin last night authorised the despatch to Chungking of a telegram on the general lines of the draft which had previously been prepared by the Foreign offics.
s I expected, dr. Bevin fully shared the view of my secretary of state that we could not agree to the suggestion that the Commander of the British Porce should accept the Japanese surrender as a delegate of
Chiang Kai Shek The principal reasons for this view are:-
(a)
that it is most important to us to avoid any apearance of receiving Hong Fong back from the Chinese; and
(b) that the suggestion that the British Force
Commander should act as the delegate of Chiang Kai Shek might well have opened the way to an attempt by Chiang Kai Shek to maintain that the British Force in
Hong Kong would be under his command (as theatre Commander) even after the surrender.
Since we spoke last night, you have probably seen the message from General kucarthur to the Japanese Imperial H.., broadcast by the Manila radio, and
General Sir Hastings Ismay, R.C.B., D.3.n.
/General