Copy
+h Complimenta
of the
etary of State
Affairs
25 Arm 1945
GUARD
GEJ. Gent Esq.
24
CYPHER
TOP SECRET DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.
F/Green FROM CHUNGKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Sir H. Seymour
No. 379.
17th April, 1945.
Repeated to SACSEA for Dening.
TOP SECRET
GUARD
D: 2.55 p.m. GMT 17th April, 1945.
R:
5.40 p.m. DBST 17th April, 1945.
I have discussed with Generals Carton de Wiart and Hayes the whole question of our liaison with Chinese and American military authorities in this theatre. One aspect is that of economic liaison raised in my telegram No. 357 on which we Are hopeful of early action; but we now request consideration of the bigger issue of liaison with advance headquarters forces re-occupying territory now held by the Japanese. Following is summary of our views as set out in a despatch which follows.
2. On the assumption that Chinese G.H.. and American grp. undec.] [grp. undec. ↑ a17 H... move forward as troops advance, we recommend early establishment of a full liaison mission to operate with advanced headquarters and consider that it should be formed round the nucleus of the present British Military Mission. lf as now seems likely British Military Mission is to play a part in programme of training Chinese troops our proposal would entail its expansion.
thy
Mission's tasks should in our view include provision of (a) information to British authorities, as to progress of war in China. (b) control of any British military personnel who may as a result of discussions now proceeding be incorporated in the China combat command, the striking force now being trained under American supervision. (c) channel for discussion of eventual aid to this theatre from British sources e.g. supplies of urgently needed material from India. (a) political and economic intelligence about re-occupied territories for this Embassy (a) information to Chinese and American field commands about British properties and facilities in areas to be liberated and (f) personnel who might be able to look after British subjects and property as and when liberated.
4.
It is to be rp. undec.7 additional personnel required should have had China experience and that the General Officer Commanding should have a political adviser with adequate military rank both to guide him and to provide continuous contact with the Embassy.
5. We understand problems arising from the
re-occupation of Hong Kong are under study but would stress the importance of similar arrangements to those outlined above for British liaison with sea-borne invading forces whenever the landing may be made. Proposed liaison mission with Chinese would also establish contact with parallel British missions in Pacific commands.