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however that such difficulties could be consigned to a high level for decision without disturbing the good relations between G 5 and the E.L.0. I believe, however, that the O. and his staff should be able to use their influence to secure the satisfactory settlement on their plane of as many contentious problems as possible. This will be the main justification for the E.L.0's existence
and success will be very largely dependent on the personal relationship factor.
a) The extent to which the E.L.0. should liaise with the Chinese requires consideration. His appointment will have to be notified to the Chinese D.M.I., to the Foreign Affairs Bureau and presumably to the Chinese M.G.O., (Gen. Yu T'a wei). I suggest that when doing so it should be made clear that he is not a collector of economic intelligence but more of an Adviser to the G.0.c. on economic affairs. His role as E.L.O. with Embassy and U.S. H.Q、 should also be mentioned. At first I feel the E.L.0. should keep fairly clear of the Chinese military and only call on the M. G.0., Government Ministries and Chinese organisations such as W.P.B. when really necessary and then together with G 5 personnel. This will prevent the latter from suspecting that he is going behind their backs to the Chinose. Later, whon rolations with G 5 have been placed on a good footing, ho can develop his Chinese contacts which will ultimately be necessary as operations develop and British interests become involved not only with the Americans but also with the Chinese forces.
f) Ultimately I foresee the E.L.0. requiring a number of assistants to Liaise with American Military Government teams in areas which contain British interests. Similarly as the E.L.0.'s work grows clerical assistance over and above that initially available from B.M.M. pool will probably be necessary, Tomporary office accommodation has been carmarked in B.M.M. office but the whole question of office equipment and personal for E.L.0. will require consideration in the fairly near future.
5.
Recommendations.
I suggest
a) that a directive be drawn up for the Economic Liaison officer defining his functions as far as possible at present and his relationship to Embassy (and Consuls), G.O.C., B.T.C., U.S. and Chinese authoritics and the local representatives of British interests.
b) that a complete survey of China as required by G 5 (sée paragraphs 3 b and d above) be requested from the competent authorities. If this information is available piecemeal rather than as a complete survey I suggest it should be obtained as available since the time factor is important. The G.0.C. could approach War Office, I.S.T.D., Oxford, I.S.T.D. SEAC, while Embassy could approach the Foreign Office.
c) that, if necessary, a ruling be requested from
F.O. and W.0. as to how much of the information to be received may be passed to G 5 and whether it should be passed spontaneously or only against specific requests.
a)/