subject. In cbing so it is only fair to record that they were formed months before, and it may be that I have subconsciously stressed those incidents during hostilities that support my ideas,
26.
I believe it perfectly true to say that the men fought well, but according to the style of Dunkirk (without attaining its standard) rather than of the "thou shalt not pass" school; all the schemes one ever heard of there were of withdrawal and none or attack. Outwardly Hong Kong fell on the 25th December, because its garrison was outfought; actually it f'ell weeks, months before, psychologically defeated. The effect of the news of the loss of H.M.S. Prince of Wales and H.M.J. Repulse together with the American naval losses and our hopeless state in the air were tremendous and then when the Mainland was evacuated after we were told that Devil's Peak was to be held at all costs, we had arrived at the stage of inter-unit criticism. I think it only fair to mention this fact about the 253. In the opinion of the M,0. who was attached to them and who had to fill a combatant role part of the time, their morale was absolutely undermined by malaria; 'many of them werè entirely unable either mentally or physically to offer anything like the resistance expected of a British soldier; that their fighting on the Mainland was not their true form was shown by the way the remnants (those who were fit)' fought on the Island later.
27.
The reasons for this psychological attitude of the garrison were these:- (1) Long sojourn. in Hong Kong where the atmosphere was anything but conducive to the development of the real fighting spirit; the Hong Kong Government was rotten to the core and its people really had no confidence whatsoever in their loaders. No one would believe that Japan would ever dare to attack this island of beauty, this Pearl of the Orient, this sanctum of the taipans; even during the first air attack on Kai Tak there were many people who did not believe that it was war! How could an army train seriously for a war that everyone knew would never take place!
(2) When war did come, it was unreal in the familiar Hong Kong surroundings. That was the use of calling Hong Kong a fortress when many families were still there, when the Club was still open, and when you could ring up your wife just as you could from the office (but with a better excuse for not coming home to dinner); Hong Kong never got down to real war until it was too late.
(3) Mental inertia was such that it was never realised that in a modern
fortress there is no place for the civilian or his mental attitude. One example should be sufficient to exemplify this. Towards the end the Field Ambulance H.Q. had to move to the Peak area and in that restricted locality there was only one place suitable and that was the basement of the War Memorial Hospital, which although nominally civilian was full of soldier casualties; we ware not welcome and were told so; later the Matron visited me and said that she had had a deputation from the Sisters asking that we should go away this from a British hospital built in memory of the fallen of the last war. This attitude was apparently also in the official mind for the Governor came to see me about the whole situation the next morning. He seemed at a loss to understand why a medical military unit should invade a civilian institution, and Hong Kong was supposed to be a military fortress.
28.
These facts display the Hong Kong mentality in cross section, its apathy, inertia, self-complacency and its limitations, and I believe they support my contentions that it was the worst possible atmosphere in which to attempt to maintain, let alone to build up, an efficient fighting spirit in the forces.
(Signed) L.T. RIDE
Lt.Col.
0.0. H.K. Field Ambulance.