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Following the discussion at or after the meeting of October 14 as to the desirability of placing aboard the Awatea as many vehicles as possible, Brig- adier Macklin had certain discussions with Brigadier Lawson as to settling the types and quantities of the vehicles to be placed aboard, pending the determin- ation by Colonel Spearing as to the amount of space available. Brigaç Macklin kept constantly in touch with Colonel Spearing following October but it was not until October 18 that Brigadier Macklin was advised by Colonel Spearing that possibly from 10,000 cubic feet to 12,000 cubic feet would be available on the Awatea for vehicles.
On receipt of this information, Brigadier Macklin settled with Brigadier Lawson a tentative list of vehicles to go and gave to Major James this list over the telephone stating that there was a possibility that the above amount of space would be available and that further word would come from himself or Colonel Spearing. Major James constantly, between October 14 and 18, kept in touch with Colonel Spearing to ascertain if the vehicles had been released by the Transport Controller, as some were already on the cars and demurrage charges were in prospect. Colonel Spearing was to advise Major James as soon as he got a second boat. Major James left instructions for his assistant, Lieut. Findley, to expect this further word and then to communicate with Mr. Connor. On October 20, Lieut. Findlay heard from Brigadier Macklin himself with a final list. It was, therefore, not until the 20th that Major James, or his assistant, was given the nccessary information as to the particular vehicles to be loaded. Before Major James had left his office on the 18th, he had ascertained from the manufacturers the contents of the loaded cars and their car numbers, so that on receiving further word, as indicated by Brigadier Macklin, he, or Lieut. Findlay, would be in a position to specify particular cars. There was thus the greatest attention to these details on the part of Major James.
On hearing from Brigadier Macklin, Lieut. Findlay immediately spoke to Mr. Connor, giving him the list of vehicles and informing him that there was some 12,000 cubic feet of free space and that it was urgent that the twenty vehicles be released and forwarded. Not having heard from Mr. Connor as to what he had done, Lieut. Findlay reported to Brigadier Macklin on October 21st. Up to this time the latter had not been told, or did not appreciate, that the shipment of mechanical transport had been held up at all. He says that he thought they were on their way to Vancouver. On learning the facts from Lieut. Findlay, he then called Colonel Spearing, who informed him that so far as the twenty vehicles were concerned there was no embargo and that they were on their way to Vancouver. At Colonel Spearing's suggestion, Brigadier Macklin called Mr. Connor and confirmed this. Colonel Spearing had called Mr. Connor on the 20th advising him of the estimated free space. Mr. Connor, in advising Brigadier Macklin that these vehicles were on their way, had told him that, while it was the intention to load as man of the twenty as possible on the Awatea, the military authorities would have to deal with any priority that might arise in case all could not be loaded. Brigadier Macklin undertook to take care of the question of priority. He did so by acquainting both the commander of the force (Briga- dier Lawson) and the staff captain (Captain Bush) with the situation and handed to both of them, on October 22nd, before they left Ottawa, a memoranduin setting out these facts. From that time forward no one at National Defence Head- quarters did anything further in connection with these twenty vehicles. This was left in the hands of the Transport Controller.
It is clear on the evidence that the amount of free space in the Awatea was at this time merely an estimate. In a cable sent by Brigadier Macklin on October 20 to the British commander at Hong Kong, it is stated:-
Because of cargo limitations of transport Awatea only very limited M.T., probably twelve to eighteen vehicles, can be shipped with troops. Re- mainder must be shipped another vessel concerning which no information available.
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Colonel Spearing did not know the shape of the space and the number of boxes which might fit into the space had to be estimated. Colonel Spearing gave evidence that as early as October 10 he had come to the conclusion that the chanical transport required by the battalions could no the carried on the ship h the troops, but that he did nothing about it until the 14th, because of his idea that the troops were not taking any vehicles. It was on that day he made his estimate as to what free space there would be for vehicles. On the 16th he received confirmation from the navy as to the total cargo capacity of the ship, and it was on the 18th, as already mentioned, before Brigadier Macklin, as the result of his conferences with Colonel Spearing and Brigadier Lawson, was able to prepare his first tentative list, which has already been referred to.
Returning to Mr. Connor, he on October 20, having heard from Lieutenant Findlay and Colonel Spearing, before releasing the twenty vehicles telegraphed to the ship's agent, Mr. P. B. Cooke, at Vancouver, to check as to whether or not the space said to be available was so in fact. The reply be received did not answer his question, but Mr. Connor decided to let the vehicles go anyway. He accordingly telephoned the manufacturers with instructions to ship and issued the necessary permits. The following day Mr. Connor telegraphed Mr. Cooke, advising him the twenty vehicles had been shipped and giving him a description of the quantities, types and weight, advising him that the numbers of the ears containing these vehicles would follow.
These cars were sent by manifest freight, which is the speediest freight service. Unless sent by special train, there was no faster means of forwarding this shipment. The evidence is that, had these cars left Toronto (which is the assembly point for this traffic) at 8.00 A.M. on the 21st, they should have arrived in Vancouver by 9.00 P.M. on October 27, one-half hour before the Awatea actually sailed. Mr. Connor ordered the ears out from Oshawa and Windsor respectively, on the afternoon of the 20th. The three cars from Oshawa left Toronto at 8.00 A.M. on October 21, but the one car from Windsor did not arrive at Toronto in time and, consequently, did not leave until 8.00 A.M. on the 22nd. The three cars reached Vancouver on the morning of the 28th, some nine hours behind schedule. They lost time between Moose Jaw and Vancouver, owing to large numbers of freight trains moving east and extra passenger trains going west. The fourth car developed a hot box at Winnipeg, where it lost a complete day, arriving in Vancouver on October 29.
During the progress of these cars across the country, Mr. Connor kept in touch with the railways and impressed upon them the urgency of the shipment. On October 25 it became apparent to him that the cars would not arrive in time, although he emphasizes that neither he nor Mr. Lockwood were informed of the sailing date, but only of the loading dates, namely, the 24th, 25th and 26th. From Mr. Connor's letter to Mr. Cooke, written October 21st, it is apparent that he was never sure that these vehicles would arrive in time and that he was doubtful as to whether in fact there would be found to be any free space in the ship suitable for loading these heavy boxes of vehicles. On October 21, Mr. Connor had learned from the British shipping authorities in Montreal that another ship would likely be available in Vancouver for loading on October 28 and he thereupon issued permits and instructed the motor companies to forward the whole balance of the 212 vehicles that day. The second ship was definitely confirmed to Mr. Connor on the following day.
In Vancouver, in addition to Mr. Cooke, Mr. Clendenning, representative there of the British Ministry of War Transport, knew that the twenty vehicles were en route. Also Lieutenant Winter, who was assisting Lieutenant Colonel Henderson, Inspector of Ordnance Services at Vancouver, in superintending the loading, was advised on October 25 and 26 by the railway agent at Van- couver as to the progress of the four cars.
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