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It will be remembered that on the evening of October 15 the Transport Controller had held up the shipment of the vehicles owing to lack of space on the Awatea. It will also be remembered that the Controller first heard of the shipment of these vehicles from Major James on the 14th, who, in turn had learned from the motor companies that they were not moving,
Although Major James says that in the case of specific shipments of boxed mechanical vehicles to such places as the West Indies, Iceland, or Newfoundland, his directorate would furnish Movement Control with particulars of the vehicles, the car numbers and their destination, he had not done so in the case of the vehicles destined for Hong Kong. Major Gwynne, Colonel Spearing's assistant, however, had received from Major James a list of the vehicles on October 13, but neither Major Gwynne nor Colonel Spearing was furnished with the car numbers. If Order 318 were being strictly followed, the Director of Mechaniza- tion, if he were "the shipper," would have done so, or, if he were not, he would have instructed "the shipper," presumably the manufacturer, to do so. Major James, in his evidence, said he thought his duty was discharged when he had made arrangements for the vehicles to be boxed and loaded on the cars. Order 318 was, in this respect, imperfectly followed by him, or his assistants. It was, however, not observed at all by Movement Control, who, although furnished on October 13 with the particulars of the vehicles, did nothing to communicate with the Transport Controller. There was thus a breakdown at this point and up to this time, namely October 14, between these two branches of National Defence Headquarters. This, however, does not alter the fact that there was no room for all the vehicles in the Awatea, nor that they would not have been permitted by the Transport Controller to go forward until shipping space for them became available. It may have some bearing, however, on the twenty vehicles, as to which an attempt was later made to forward for loading in the Awatea.
There is, moreover, other evidence bearing on the question as to where the responsibility for the rail movement of the mechanical transport, as a whole, lay. The meeting of the directors of October 14, already referred to, had arranged that the directorates of the Ordnance Branch would co-ordinate with Movement Control and Colonel Hennessy as to this movement. At this meeting Colonel Spearing reported that it looked as though the Awatea could not take all the vehicles. He was to ascertain what, if any, space would be available for some vehicles and the means by which the remainder could be sent. It was fully recognized at this meeting that the stores, equipment and weapons must have priority. There was a discussion following this meeting at which Major James was not, but Colonel Spearing was, present, when it was agreed that the ship should take everything she could.
It was in the morning of October 14, and prior to the meeting of that date, which was held in the afternoon, that Major James had learned from the motor companies that, while they were loading the vehicles on the ears, they had not received permits from the Transport Controller, as a result of which he had called Mr. Connor, and Mr. Connor in turn had discussed with Colonel Spearing the proposed movement. Colonel Spearing was to send to Mr. Connor, in code, the steamer's name, so that Mr. Connor might ascertain its cargo capacity.
Before attending the meeting of October 14, Colonel Spearing also spoke to Commander German at Naval Headquarters, asking him to ascertain whether the Awatea would have capacity for "40 odd carloads of mechanical vehicles in cases and at least 10 carloads of other stores." Colonel Spearing made a memorandum of this conversation at the time. It contains this: "Also told him that I was arranging for the M.T. to arrive on the 25th and the other stores on the 26th for loading." The information as to the vehicles given by Colonel Spearing to Commander German in this conversation, he had obtained from the list handed to his assistant, Major Gwynne, by Major James on the preceding day.
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At the meeting of the Directors held in the afternoon of the 14th, Major James handed to Colonel Spearing a more detailed list of the 212 vehicles con- taining information in addition to that contained in the list handed to Major Gwynne, including the name of the consignee, which was "the Officer Com- ding Force 'C', c/o Ordnance Officer, Vancouver". Although both Colonel caring and Major James came to this mecting with the knowledge that the movement of the vehicles had not commenced, because the Transport Controller had not been applied to for permits, neither mentioned it at that time. The procedure for seeing that the vehicles were sent and delivered in time ought, of course, to have been clearly settled between these two officers; and the minutes of the meeting state that these officers, along with others, were to co-ordinate their efforts. Major James came away from the meeting thinking the matter from then on was entirely for Colonel Spearing and the Transport Controller. Colonel Spearing, however, says he was to have nothing to do with the movement of the vehicles. He says that not only had he had nothing to do with the movement of boxed mechanical transport in the past, but that he had understood from a memorandum dated October 11, received by him from the Directorate of Mechanization, that no mechanical transport at all would be taken with the Force. I have read this memorandum. It states merely that the battalions when proceeding from their respective Military Districts would take no mechanical transport with them. This refers, of course, to the mechan- ical transport previously in the possession of these units and not to the new vehicles coming from the factories, which were intended for the expedition. In any event, on October 13, Colonel Spearing's assistant had the list of what was going and Colonel Spearing himself had full particulars at and prior to the meeting of October 14th. Any misapprehension he may have had as to what was going with the troops in the way of mechanical transport was completely dispelled by that time; and he was charged at that time with the duty of ascertaining whether any vehicles could go on the Awatea, and what ship would be available for the remainder.
On October 15 Colonel Spearing wrote to the Transport Controller giving him particulars of the movement, including 50 carloads of vehicles and spare parts. This was not received by the Controller until October 17. In the mean- time, the shipment of all the vehicles had been held up.
In his conversation with Mr. Connor on the morning of October 14, Colonel Spearing had then advised Mr. Connor that the traffic to Vancouver should be consigned to the Ordnance Transit Officer there. Colonel Spearing said he did not know whether there would be such an officer there, but, if there were not, "somebody" would be acting in that capacity to handle this particular movement. No Ordnance Transit Officer was, in fact, appointed and in the particulars of the shipment given to Colonel Spearing by Major James at the meeting of October 14 it was clearly set out that the consignee was the Officer Commanding Force "C", in care of the "Ordnance Officer", Vancouver. This officer is permanently located at Vancouver. If there was to be an "Ordnance Transit Officer" he would have had to be specially designated from Ottawa for this particular movement. The address given also contained the words "In Transit". This meant, of course, that the material was sent in care of the Ordnance Officer at Vancouver for a further destination. It did not mean the "Ordnance Transit Officer.”
Colonel Spearing did not correct the information given Mr. Connor, and a letter was sent at a later date by Mr. Connor addressed to the "Ordnance Transit Officer". After some travels, it reached Lieutenant Winter, who had been sent out from Ottawa to assist in superintending the loading of the ship. Perhaps any delay in the delivery of the letter may not have produced any result so far as the getting of any of the vehicles on the Awatea is concerned, but the incident is one which a little more care would have prevented.
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