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bayonets prior to their departure for Newfoundland. I accept the evidence of Colonel Lamb that the regiment was fully trained and practised (including range practice) in the use of these weapons.
Practice in firing the Tommy-gun was not possible to Canadian battalion before October, 1941, as they have only recently been equipped with then There are 42 Tommy-guns in the establishment of a battalion. This gun is a useful weapon for close fighting. It is simple to understand and use.
The anti-tank rifle is a high velocity, single shot rifle capable of firing armour- piercing bullets. In general, in its mechanism and use, it is similar to an ordinary rifle. There are now 25 anti-tank rifles in the establishment of a battalion; these are carried and intended to be used by the headquarters personnel of each platoon and by various platoons of the headquarters company. Until recently, this weapon and its ammunition have not been available to Canadian units.
As to the grenade, or Mills bomb, I am satisfied, on the evidence, that a soldier practised in the use of "dummy" bombs (which are smiilar in all respects to "live" bombs, except that they contain no charge of high explosive) would be capable of effectively using "live" bombs in actual operations. Training both in Canada and in England in fact is given with the "dummy" bomb and “live” bombs are reserved for use against the enemy.
Speaking generally, the Royal Rifles had no firing practice with the Tommy- gun, nor had they been trained in the mechanism and use of the anti-tank rifle, but the evidence satisfies me that soldiers completely trained and practised in the rifle and Bren gun could quickly master both the anti-tank rifle and the Tommy-gun. They were fully trained in the mechanism and use (tactical and otherwise) of the 3" mortar. They had only one 2′′ mortar for one month for instructional purposes, but again I am satisfied, from the evidence, that from their knowledge and training in other weapons they could quickly master the 2" mortar.
The Winnipeg Genadiers were mobilized as a machine gun battalion at Winnipeg on September 1, 1939, at the outbreak of the present war. Before mobilization the regiment was a reserve unit in the Non-Permanent Active Militia. The regiment trained in Winnipeg during the autumn and winter of 1939-40. In the spring of 1940 it was assigned to garrison duties in the West Indies, relieving an Imperial Army battalion stationed there. The battalion reached the West Indies late in May and early in June, 1940, and remained there on duty for more than a year. It returned to Canada in three flights on the 9th of September, 1941, 21st September, 1941, and 8th October, 1941. Almost immediately it was warned for duty overseas.
At the time of mobilization and until June, 1941, the battalion was com- manded by Lieutenant-Colonel O. M. M. Kay, who is now attached to National Defence Headquarters at Ottawa with the rank of Brigadier. Lt.-Col. Kay was succeed in command of the regiment in June, 1941, by Lieutenant- Colonel J. L. R. Sutcliffe, who had been second-in-command from the date of mobilization. Colonel Sutcliffe, who went with his regiment to Hong Kong, was an experienced officer who served in several theatres of war in the last World War. I had the advantage of hearing the evidence of Brigadier Kay, who was able to give a full description of the character and training of the Winnipeg Grenadiers while they were under his command prior to June, 1941. Brigadier Kay says:-
The officers all knew one another and had known one another and worked together for a period of not one year but three or four years. The N.C.O's were known by all of the officers and were old reliable trained N.C.O.'s. Working in a garrison where you worked in small groups, the men are in constant contact with the N.C.O.'s, and the N.C.O. and the officer knows the capability of every man he has. Individually if they worked and were known well together, and they worked in small groups well they would work well in a mass.
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He said, speaking from his knowledge of the training and state of efficiency at which the battalion had arrived in the summer of 1941, that it was fit for duty at Hong Kong.
All of the officers, save one, had been peace-time officers, and a number of hem had seen service overseas in the last war. had been in the battalion when it was a reserve unit and had come into the active large percentage of the N.C.O's service battalion on mobilization. Brigadier Kay says his officers were capable and that they and the N.C.O's were well-trained. Over fifty per cent of the rank and file had been in the reserve battalion and enlisted on mobilization and many of the men came from the northern mining districts of Manitoba.
General Crerar says:-
As regards Winnipeg Grenadiers, I had studied the periodic training reports on this unit while in the West Indies, forwarded by its O.C., which indicated that within the pre-occupation of its garrison duties, it was successfully progressing in its tactical and weapons training. I also had first hand information furnished by its O.C., Lieutenant-Colonel Kay, who reported to Ottawa in the summer of 1941 to take up appointment as D.A.G. Lieutenant-Colonel Kay then informed me that his unit was ready and restless for more active service, and expressed the hope that it would not be brought back to Canada in the meantime. I advised Lieutenant- Colonel Kay at that time that my reason for return of Winnipeg Grena- diers to Canada was that while it was probably quite fit for garrison respon- sibilities it would be desirable to give it a short period of unit and refresher training before embodying it in field formations, destined for overseas. As this unit had been mobilized for two years, had experienced and successfully undertaken more independent responsibilities than any other unit in Canada, had been favourably reported upon to me in some detail by its late C.O., Brigadier Kay, its general fitness for active service after a short period of refresher training was specially indicated.
The evidence leaves no doubt in my mind that the confidence of the Chief of the General Staff in the personnel of officers, N.C.O's and men was well founded.
This battalion having been mobilized as a machine gun battalion, its estab- lishment differed from that of an infantry battalion. During the autumn and winter of 1939-40 it trained as a machine gun battalion using the Vickers machine gun as its principal weapon. The training was carried out in a progressive manner on a syllabus of training prepared by the General Staff Officer of Military District No. 10, and under his observation. By May, 1940, the battalion had done its individual, section, platoon and company training. During that period also the anti-aircraft platoon of the headquarters company trained with the Lewis machine gun. The battalion also had two anti-tank rifles for training purposes and was equipped with rifles and revolvers. Individual training with rifles had been completed. Prior to May, 1940, the training with these weapons did not include firing at outdoor ranges.
On May 13, 1940, the battalion was inspected by an Inspector-General, who reported that at that time the senior officers were all good, with one exception, who was said to be fair. The junior officers "are of good type-good education- all qualified and reported as satisfactory". The non-commissioned officers were "all of good type-well qualified and reported on as efficient-above average”. The rank and file were "good class-excellent physique-have made very good progress in training".
With regard to musketry, this report states that all the battalion had fired Part I on the miniature range but had not fired their classification with service rifles. The anti-aircraft platoon had fired its 25-yard classification, with the light machine gun and about 600 men had fired Parts 3 to 5 with the Vickers gun, 400 qualifying as 1st and 2nd class shots. With regard to this, the report
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