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it was suggested in evidence that the experience gained in manning outposts in Newfoundland against possible enemy attack, by day or by night, would be peculiarly valuable.
It may be observed that the supreme importance of having well-trained platoon commanders was fully recognized in the last war. On July 29, 1918 little more than a week before he launched his final offensive, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig entered in his diary: "This is a platoon commander's war".
in the spring of 1941 the battalion moved to St. John's, Newfoundland, and was there concentrated as a unit. To it, seven defence localities were assigned and defence schemes often involving the whole battalion were devised for each locality. Several of these defence schemes required in their execution co- operation with units of the Newfoundland militia. The training reports give evidence of the variety of training manoeuvres, which included tactical exercises by two or more companies, night exercises, field exercises, training in fieldcraft and section leading, stand-to alarms, etc., etc.
The evidence establishes that the training received by the Royal Rifles in Newfoundland was vigorously carried out and resulted in the creation of a unit at least as well-trained as other units in Canada in September, 1941. Individual training of the men was far advanced and their duties in Newfoundland improved their health and physical stamina. Their collective training up to and including the battalion level was also well advanced. I quote the evidence of Brigadier Earnshaw, the General-Officer-Commanding in Newfoundland, but first I give this observation with regard to the Royal Rifles by General Crerar:-
As regards state of training of Royal Rifles, apart from observations of Commanders under whom this unit served (General Elkins, Brigadier Earnshaw), I had advantage of personal visits and general inspection of this unit at Sussex Camp, New Brunswick, in autumn of 1940, and at St. John's (Newfoundland) in early summer of 1941. These personal inspections and contacts gave me confidence in qualities and abilities of O. C. (Lieutenant- Colonel Home), the Second-in-Ĉommand (Major Price) and generally in officers and men who comprised it.
Brigadier Earnshaw says:-
The Battalion was moved from that portion of Newfoundland to Saint John's, Newfoundland, I think from memory in April, and from then until the time it left the battalion was concentrated together as a unit and had with it its full war-time scale of mechanical equipment, and during that period it had very few indeed what I class garrison duties, and was entirely free to carry out its operational role, which was in fact to be prepared to meet an enemy landing or a move at St. John's from any direction. The training and preparation to fulfil that operational role was what it spent most of its time on almost entirely training during that period.
Q. You said that the battalion had its full mechanical equipment. What about other equipment, weapons?-A. Well, it had its full scale to the extent to which they were available.
Q. Can we put it this way, that it was fully equipped as a battalion in all respects? A. Yes, except, of course, that it did not have certain weapons, but neither did any other battalion.
I proceed to discuss the weapon training the Royal Rifles had received at the time of their designation as part of Force "C", that is to say, October 9th, 1941.
The Royal Rifles had at all times their full share of rifles and bayonets, an adequate supply of light machine guns (both Bren and Lewis) and pistols, and their full scale of transport vehicles. They had one 2′′ mortar for instructional purposes; but with this exception, they had no 2" mortars, or anti-tank rifles. In this respect they were in the same case as Canadian battalions generally, although,
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as we shall see, the Winnipeg Grenadiers had available for instruction in training while in Jamaica a number of anti-tank rifles. The unit had from April, 1941 its full complement of 3" mortars, according to the scale which governed at the ime, that is to say, two for the battalion, which were in the hands of the mortar atoon of the headquarters company, the commander and sergeant of which had taken a special course at the Long Branch School. They had, therefore, opportunities for training in this arm not possessed by Canadian battalions generally. The 3" mortar was included in all the defence schemes and counter- attack schemes in the 7 defence districts in the vicinity of St. John's. The full issue of 2" mortars was received by the unit when being equipped for the Hong Kong expedition. Four Thompson sub-machine guns (the Tommy-gun, so- called) reached the battalion at St. John's, one month before its departure from Newfoundland. The officers and non-commissioned officers were fully instructed in the mechanism and use of it. One gun was given to each company. Ammunition both for the 3" mortars, as well as for the tommy-gun, was lacking. There were no live grenades in Newfoundland for practice purposes and training in grenade throwing was done with dummy grenades.
It is convenient here to quote textually some passages of the evidence of Lt.-Col. Sparling, of the Directorate of Military Training, an officer competent to speak upon this subject and whose evidence I accept:-
Q. And you went on to explain that there were certain weapons they did not have, but you said also, I understood, and I wondered if I correctly understood you there, that other units had not these weapons?-A. No, my lord. For example, none of them had 2" mortars, and neither did these two units.
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Q. I merely want to understand you. None of them had 2" mortars and none of them had the Boys anti-tank guns?-A. There were very few of those, my lord. For instance, the Winnipeg Grenadiers at that time had 4; the Royal Rifles had none. There was one issued as a pool weapon in Newfoundland for passing around amongst the units in Newfoundland.
Q. I wonder if it would not be more convenient if you took the units individually instead of dealing with them both together. Or perhaps you were dealing with them in that way?........ The situation is not identical? A. It is not quite identical in that the Royal Rifles had been able to carry out their annual classification during 1941, whereas the Winnipeg Grenadiers up to the time they arrived back had not been able actually to carry out their firing practice; but in so far as such things as tests of elementary training are concerned they had full opportunity for that because the test for elementary training does not include range practice. And there is one minor point there, namely, that the Winnipeg Grenadiers did not have dummy grenades, whereas the Royal Rifles and other units had dummy grenades.
Q. Does that properly describe the situation as regard these two battalions? A. Yes. In my opinion those two were up to the standard of the other units in the country.
Q. As well trained as any other unit?-A. Yes.
These passages apply to the Winnipeg rGenadiers as well as to the Royal Rifles. They show that the Royal Rifles were privileged in comparison with other Canadian battalions in respect of 3" mortars and, as already mentioned, had opportunities of training in that weapon denied to Canadian battalions generally, while the Winnipeg Grenadiers were privileged in like manner in respect of the Boys anti-tank rifle.
There are 867 rifles and 50 Bren guns prescribed for issue to an infantry battalion, the ammunition for the Bren gun being the same as that for the rifle. This would in fact and practice be the normal equipment of such a battalion in Canada. The Royal Rifles were fully equipped with Bren guns, rifles and
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