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8. While I do not recommend that the total number of Infantry Battalions now allocated to coast defence duties should be reduced, it will be satisfactory, from both the operational and training points of view, if the responsibilities of two of these coast defence battalions were to undertaken, successively, by infantry units from the 4th Division and Brigade Groups of the 6th Division. This would reduce the number of battalions now held in general (mobile) reserve from 13 battalions (4th Division plus one Infantry Brigade of 6th Division) to 11 battalions, but this number, in my opinion, should be ample to meet any contingency which may arise in Canada within the next six or more months.
9. After examining the problem from various aspects, I have come to the conclusion that the most suitable selections from amongst the bat- talions now on coast defence or in the 3 Infantry Brigade Groups of the 6th Division would be:-
(a) The Royal Rifles of Canada-Quebec
(b) The Winnipeg Grenadiers-Winnipeg
10. As you know, these units returned not long ago from duty in Newfoundland and the West Indies respectively. The duties which they there carried out were not in many respects unlike the task which awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The experience they have had will therefore be of no small value to them in their new role. Both are units of proven efficiency.
11. In my opinion, the balance of argument favours the selection of these two battalions. I would be very reluctant to allot them indefinitely to a home defence role as the effect on their morale, following a period of "semi-overseas" responsibilities would be bound to be adverse. The selec- tion represents both Eastern and Western Canada. In the case of the Royal Rifles, there is also the fact that this battalion, while nominally English-speaking, is actually drawn from a region overwhelmingly French- speaking in character and contains an important proportion of Canadians of French descent.
12. I have spoken to the Adjutant-General and there are no adminis- trative difficulties which should prevent the early movement of these two battalions.
(Sgd.) H.D.G.C.
Major-General, C.G.S.
It is convenient to quote here from the evidence given by General Crerar:-
In the light of situation in the Far East obtaining at that time, I selected those particular battalions for the reason stated in my memo- randum dated September 30th.
And further:-
I have already referred to training and service which these two units had undergone, and in their cases it was a few weeks refresher only which was indicated.
General Crerar was better qualified than anyone else to advise the Gov- ernment in respect to the composition of Force "C". He had at his command all available sources of information as to the history, the training, and the character of all ranks of the battalions available. He had complete knowledge of the claims (and their relative value) arising out of the necessities of home defence and commitments overseas. He fully understood the military con- siderations affecting the relative importance, for example, of maintaining and strengthening our forces in Great Britain and maintaining sufficient reserves for them. It is clear from the evidence of General McNaughton that he would
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have opposed, on military grounds, of course, with the utmost of his influence, any withdrawal, for the expedition to Hong Kong, of any of the battalions already "earmarked" for the Canadian Corps in Great Britain. It would be he duty of the Chief of the General Staff to weigh all the considerations ecting the advisability of taking any unit from the 4th Division. Nobody was in a better position to weigh such considerations. No one could be better capable for forming an estimate of the effect of any given choice upon the morale of the army as a whole, or of any particular part of it. While war with Japan was not, he thought, imminent, he realized that it was a contingency which must be taken into account. He had, as we have seen, recent and authoritative information respecting the situation in Hong Kong. In these circumstances he said in his recommendation:-
2. As these units are going to a distant and important garrison where they will be detached from any other Canadian forces, a primary con- sideration is that they should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion in any circumstances.
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10. As you know, these units returned not long ago from duty in Newfoundland and the West Indies respectively. The duties which they there carried out were not in many respects unlike the task which awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The experience they have had will therefore be of no small value to them in their new role. Both are units of proven efficiency.
The Minister of National Defence received this recommendation from General Crerar and discussed it with him. Colonel Ralston stated in evidence that he discussed only one point with General Crerar. As all units are anxious to have an opportunity to serve outside Canada, and as the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers had already had assignments to Newfoundland and the West Indies, respectively, he asked for the opinion of General Crerar whether the selection of these two battalions for a second turn of overseas duty would give other units in Canada a feeling that there was discrimination against them and in favour of these two battalions. General Crerar thought, Colonel Ralston says, that there were two sides to this question and "that these units, having done duty abroad and having served well, were entitled to have this assign- ment, and that it would make for the morale of the army that it be given to them rather than that other units be selected and these two units re-assigned to coast defence duty in Canada". The Minister of National Defence gave his approval to the selection made by the Chief of the General Staff. I am quite unable to understand on what principle the Minister of National Defence is chargeable with error in judgment in acting on the recommendation of the Chief of the General Staff. I can perceive no ground upon which the propriety of his decision to accept the advice of his professional adviser can be justly criticized.
It is not without interest to mention that, in discussing the selection of these units with Colonel (now Brigadier) Macklin, of the General Staff, before the formal recommendation was made, General Crerar observed to Colonel Macklin, with regard to them, "they have been half-way to the war already ". It is well to emphasize that General Crerar laid it down as the funda- mental condition of the selection of the units for this force that "they should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion in any circumstances"; and his decision that they fulfilled that condition is the basis of his recommendation. General Crerar was not merely giving an opinion; he was deciding upon a matter of fact, which it was his duty as Chief of the General Staff to decide, for the purpose of making recommen- dation concerning the composition of this force, upon which he expected the
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