92
also between the United States and Great Britain",
5. Finally I think I should draw your attention to the following quotation in a later passage of Drow's letter. It does not refer to any telegram from the United Kingdom Government but to a telegram from the Canadian Military Headquarters in London wording of which indicates that it was based on the information in one or more of the United Kingdom telegrams under reference, quotation begins.
"Nor is it easy to understand emphasis placed by the Commissioner on the isolated words contained in a message. Not from the British Government but from Canadian Military H.Q. on October 26th. After referring to them several times, they are quoted as the very last words in the report and appear as though they constituted exhibit 45 at the inquiry. . These are the words and the only words from that message quoted in the report, Consensus of opinion that war in Far East unlikely at present'. But exhibit 40
#
contains a great deal more than that. Very next sentence modifies the effect of those words' while no immediate action by Japan expected however will be probably more vigorous assertion what she considers her rights'. Then a little later were the words, - 'Generally considered that when time arrives initial movement of Japanese Force will probably be northerly against Russia and not to south against our Forcea'
'In another communication it had been made clear that an attack on Russia would bring us in. Thus we find that while the message does express the opinion that war in the Far East was unlikely 'at present' or 'immediately' an attack was expected which would bring us into the war, The last sentence quoted does not say 'If time arrives' it says 'When time arrives'. These additional quotations would have been helpful in conveying the real purport of message",
Copy to:-
V.0.
F. 0. W.C.O.
C. O.
(M.0.2. (B. O, 12)
Lt. Col. Spurling (4)
Col. Dinwiddie
Mr. Ashley Clarke
Sir. E. Bridges Lt. Col. Stirling Mr. Monson.