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may have been conveyed to the other members of the War Committee or the Cabinet as a whole, you know that this finding of the Commissioner
s directly contrary to the facts. You will recall that you received messages before the despatch of the Hong Kong force which left no doubt whatever that the British Government was of the opinion that it was necessary to take stock of the situation in the Pacific. You know that you received one message which stated in explicit terms that the time had come to reckon with the possibility of an early attack. The message left no doubt that the Japanese Government had passed under the control of extremists on October 16th and that in their opinion war in the Pacific was an early possibility.
Let me refer particularly to two messages of October 24th. One of these was a lengthy despatch quoting from an earlier despatch on October 18th. I have good reason for remembering that particular message. It had been withheld from the record. It was not produced during the hearing. It was only six days after we had completed and forwarded written arguments, and indeed it was after we had completed oral comment thereon on May 22nd that I saw it for the first time and read it to the Commissioner. It contained the most explicit warming of the possibility of early hostilities. The other measage of the same date is, however, included in the record. It was not introduced by Commission Counsel. It would not have been introduced at all had
I not recalled one of the intelligence officers on the last afternoon. This was merely one of many examples of the difficulty I encountered in obtaining the facts because of the determined effort to withhold information. That message referred in specific terms to the 'altered circumstances'. It was a message of the utmost importance because it showed that the British Admiralty was acting upon the assumption that danger had increased in the Pacific and that in addition to the escort already arranged for the troopship, a cruiser escort was being provided from Manila to Hong Kong." In spite of that message and of the other message which he read on the last day we appeared in Ottawa, the Commissioner quotes in support of his finding, these words of General Stuart;-'Yes, and there were no wires received by us during that period from the United Kingdom that indicated any change in the situation.' "Having regard to the messages which were placed before him, this finding of the Commissioner is utterly incomprehensible. On many occasions you have quite properly called public attention to the system of daily communication by wire and by telephone which has prevailed between the British Government and your office covering all important information and change of circumstances relating to the war. In addition therefore to the very definite communications disclosed at the hearing as I have related, it is inconceivable that other communications of an earlier date did not pass between your Office and the British Government either direct or through the medium of Canada House". (I have no record of the second telegram of October 24th referred to above. It appears to be one from the War Office or some other authority in London whose messages I do not receive copies of).
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(4) Shortly after, Drew comments as follows,- Begins. "There should therefore be no delay in correcting the wholly unjust and utterly unwarranted impression conveyed by the Commissioners report that the Canadian Government, having relied upon the Government of Great Britain, received no warning of the impending danger which The had so much impressed the American Government on October 16th. British Government will admit their mistakes just as will the Government of the United States. Both have shown a reassuring willingnese to do so. It would be a shameful and humiliating thing for us to blame our mistakes on othera. The impression is conveyed that the British Government did not communicate any warning to the Government of Canada. That is not 8o. Such impression can đo immeasurable harm, having regard to the evil influences which are busily engaged in an effort to create friction and arouse antagonism between the members of the British Commonwealth and
Alco