5.
- 2
On the right the line ran down the slopes from the neighbourhood of Wanchai Gap in a southerly direction towards the sea east of Aberdeen, where contact was made with the very small mixed force which was gallantly main- taining access to the magazines at Little Hong Kong. General Maltby now reported that the whole of this line had "gone"; I have had no opportunity to ascertain to what pressure this line had been subjected by the enemy. General Maltby made it clear, however, that the forces in this sector were no longer formed up either on the original line or in any alternative positions.
6.
The news from the centre was that Wanchai Gap, where Battalion Headquarters were situated, and Magazine Gap, the position of Brigade Headquarters, had fallen into the hands of the enemy. This loss was as serious as it was unexpected. By attaining Magazine Gap, the enemy had dis- rupted our communications and it was open to him to occupy the whole of the Peak district where European women and children were collected in houses. These were at the time being shelled and some, so I was informed, were on fire; it may be observed here that for some time we had been unable to reply to the enemy's artillery fire. It was also open to the enemy to advance down Magazine Gap Road, where he would meet with no opposition until he had practically reached the heart of the city and behind, that is to say to the west (?) of the Army and Navy Headquarters mentioned hereafter. As has already been said, we were in the final pocket and the loss of Magazine Gap opened another seam.
7.
On the left, where the line ran in a southerly direction from the waterfront, the enemy had just previously gained considerable advantage. He had occupied Leighton Hill and, after putting out of action all our machine guns on Morrison Hill, had cut off the troops in that sector by penetrating the air raid tunnels under the Naval Hospital and was now advancing down the streets of Wanchai. General Maltby now informed me that Colonel Stewart, the Commanding Officer of the Middlesex Regiment, had reported that his battalion and his defence positions were completely over-run, and that what remained might hold out in the neighbourhood of Battalion Headquarters for another half hour, not more. This would bring the enemy up to Army Headquarters and Naval Head- quarters in the Naval Dockyard. These, with the few remaining posts of the Punjabi Regiment might hold out for another two hours but not longer. This would be the end of all defence on the vital harbour front sector and the enemy would then have before him the undefended centre of the city, which he would be able to reach, if this appreciation of the situation were correct, not later than 6 P.M. on the same day. An important element in the situation was that it was no longer possible to postpone the decision which I was called upon to make without involving the General's own Headquarters in hand to hand fighting. Once this occurred, it had to be presumed that all possibility of communications and staff work would cease.
8.
Such, then, was the situation reported to me by General Maltby. We discussed it in some detail and General Maltby made it clear that he saw no possibility of restoring the situation on any of these three sectors. We were communicating by telephone and I had with me in my office in Government House two of the three civilian members of the Defence Committee, the Colonial Secretary and the Attorney- General; the third member, the Defence Secretary, was not available. I kept my civilian colleagues fully informed throughout the discussion. Immediately afterwards I tele- phoned to the Commodore, who was in full possession of the facts; he agreed with General Maltby's recommendation. I may here state, although it is not necessary for me to do so, that both the General and the Commodore were very ready, and made it clear that they were so ready, to defend their Headquarters with their own persons and those of their
66