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strategy. Taking advantage of them, the Japanese entered Kowloon after a brief engagement for which they paid a very little price. iter occupying the city, the small islami of nongkong, being isolated, was helpless.
Bau lolicy: The Government of on kong was not de- mocratically administrateu, contradicting the desire of the majority of its population. Favouritisa, corruption, in- justic, etc. played an important part. The so-called Chinese representatives were selected and appointed by the Govern- ment did not actually represent the people who did not se- lect then, ani consequently had no faith in them. Cnly the government people valued them highly because what they did was nothing more than to please those who granted them the privilege. Over 30, of the total Chinese who formed 97% of the Hongkong population were against this form of government, hated the representatives thus had long planned to oust the latter with a hope that the one Government will create a new regimenich the general public will have equal voice.
Knowing this very motive the Japanese, six months pre- ceeding the attack, started work with them and male them their 5th column at huge expenses. In addition to giving them three days to ransack the city after the British defeat, the Japanese promise them whatever they desired in the new ad- ministration. hen the attack began, they aides the Japanese by creating behind the British lines extensive distrubances by which a great confusion and terrible panic were resulted.
In the normal time the British authorities, pecuase overvalu- ing the so-called Chinese representatives and also trusting them too much in handling the situation, isrgarued the peo- ple of the 30, entirely or rather looked them down. As a re- sult they mau not a siiɛnt idea when the Japanesc plotted the attack with them.