OUTWARD TELEGRAM
[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and should be kept under Lock and Key.]
[This telegram is of' particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].
2051/74/10)
No: 410
27th March, 1942.
AMENDED DISTRIBUTION
WAR CABINET DISTRIBUTION
TO CHINA
FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CHUNGKING
Da 2. 40 a.m. 28th March, 1942.
Repeated to Washington No, 1977.
SECRET
11111
290
I have had under consideration the desirability of concluding a now treaty with Chine with a view to the encouragement of the Chinese as a preparation for work together in the post-war era and as a counterpoise to a possible agreement with Russia. After roviewing all the questions which might provide a subject for a suitable treaty I have concluded that the most promising for the purpose is the abrogation of cur extraterritorial rights which we are already committed to negotiate when peace is restored, What effect would an offer to negotiate such a treaty now have on the Chinese? Would they regard it as a generous gesture and react accordingly? or would they regard it, coming at the present moment, merely as an act of weakness?
2. If we proceeded with the proposal, two major points would arise. What kind of safeguards, if any, do you think it would be necessary for us to claim? (You will have in mind the importance of avoiding acrimonious discussions such as occurred on certain points in the negotiations which led up to the draft treaty of 1931).
3. Secondly, should the treaty apply (a) to the whole of China, whether occupied or not, or (b) to all parts of China over which the Chinese Government exercise control either now or in the future? Which do you think tho Chinese Government would prefer and which would be your own choice? A disadvantage of form (a) would be that we should be removing by our own action the basis of the recent arrangements with the Swiss by which they assumed jurisdiction over British subjects in the occupied areas. If form (b) were chosen, it would leave the legal position as regards jurisdiction in those áreas unchanged, but it would perhaps have the disadvantage that the limitation of the immediate scope of the treaty might also limit its propaganda value,
4. Regardless of whether we make a treaty with Chiang Kai-shek or not, the Japanese may at any time subject our nationals to puppet courts, but conclusion of treaty may well haston the process. Do you think the choice of form of treaty will make any difference frcia this point of view?
5. There is bound to be opposition from firms trading in China, but at the end of the war thore could in any case be no question of our maintaining our extraterritorial privileges.
6. Before any approach is made to the Chinese Government, it is our intention, besides seeking the consent of the Dominions, to consult the United States Government. But if we proceed with these proposals, I should like the Chinese Government to realise that the initiative came from us. In the meantime you should say nothing to them and I shall await your comments before approaching the Dominions and united States Governments.
[INDIV ].