-2-
8
4.Mobilizations (Contd.) Recruitment of Officer personnel from out- ports to meet increasing commitments has proceeded throughout the year.
5. Evacuation. On 1st. July, on forty eight hours notice, one hundred and forty two women and children, families of mobilized and
unmobilized members, were evacuated under a scheme modelled on the naval scheme and prepared in advance by officers of this Force. By agreement with the Commodore these families were treated in all respects cs civilian evacuees. It is considered that the scheme op rated smoothly and with a minimum of inconvenience.
-
It has been reported to me by husbands whose families were evacuated under the H.K.R.V.V.R. scheme and by many others that by the steadiness of two members of that party Mrs.J.Petrie and Mrs. R.J. Vernall - and by their constant efforts in looking after the welfare of the party excellent service was rendered at a time of considerable emotional upset to all evacuees. Had these ladies not been the wivesS or the two Senior Officers cr this Force I should have made this the subject of special mention earlier. This report would, however, be incomplete if I did not record the fact.
6. H.1.5.Cornilower. On 17th August 1940 the sloop, H.M.S."Cornflower", was handed back to the Admiralty, and the River Steamer "TAI HING", loaned by Sir Robert Ho Tung for the duration of the war, replaced her as temporary Headquarters and Depot Ship. On 7th September by authority of the Admiralty's signal to Commodore timed 2116/7/8/40 the "Tai Hing" was named "H.M.S.Cornflower". That signal approved the Commodore Hong Kong's proposal "to retain the name 'H.M.S.Cornflower in perpetuity for use of the H.K.R.N.V.R. Headquarters whether afloat or onshore". This change "can only be in the nature of a temporary expedient and the need for a shore Headquarters is as pressing as ever".
7. Exp.nse of Operation.
As reported last year the Admiralty is bearing the charter fees, expense of operation and upkeep of Auxiliary Patrol Vessels and wages of
taken over civilian crew/with these vessels end upkeep of the three Shore Stations all under my command. G.vernment bears the pay and cost of uniforms etc. for volunteer personnel and the maintenance of H.M.S.Cornflower.
Borne by Government
Pay Roll April 1940 to March 1941 inclusive =
Annual Vote 1st. January 1940 to 31st March, 1941
$788,537.86
V. bed plus S/V's.
$84,896.00
Expended (approx.)
Emoluments)
55,085.00
Saving (Mainly in Personal
$29,811.00
Total Expended
$55,085.00
#843,622.86
فنا وهل
Commander,H.K.R.N.V.R. g Commanding Officer.
1941
Pag
Pag
ge 9
9
HONG KONG ROYAL NAVAL VOLUNTEER RESERVE
H..S. CORNFLOWER",
HONG LONG.
30th August, 1940.
CONFIDENTIA I.
A.S.R. 71/40.
(Auxiliary Services Routine)
In A.S.F. 9 (1939) I gave a review of events within the Force over the first week after mobilizɛtion. Today, four days before the
Empire has the anniversary of its entry into the war, we have the anniversary of our first mobilization. I would like to review events over that year in the confidence of A.S.R's.
The first few weeks after mobilization ɛre remembered ɛs weeks of work at highest pressure in the heat of su mer. The adjustment to some semblance of order and routine was hɛrd work but it was accomplished with remarkable harmony and good-temper and I owe a great deal to the excellent spirit that prevailed then end preveils now.
To the sea-going members the first few weeks were occupied by officers in getting to know ships. It was not a case of getting to know their own ship because there wɛs not any they were given a different ship almost everyday until they knew them all. To the Seemen Ratings the first few weeks seemed as sublimely uneventful as life in general seems to the mass of Chinese but to the Communication Branch Ratings the acquiring of "seɛ. legs" was a painful process.
The Minewatching Branch began watchkeeping and has gradually developed to ɛ full degree of maintenance and control of stations which was never envisaged in time of peace.
There was shortage of mobilized officer personnel due to the main effect of the war not having reached Hong Kong. A balance between local seɛ defence requirements and the needs of employers to retain their staff had to be found. The Admiralty needed the men but the Home Government stated that trade must be maintained - result, the formation of a local Reference Board to assess the claims of both parties. Other evenues for recruitment of officer personnel were therefore explored, notably Shanghai, from which port many officers have now arrived.
Some more of the hurdles we have cleared
(a) Rapid expansion, greater number and variety of duties, more and
larger ships.
(b) Refitting of new vessels for service - difficulties due to hetrogen-
eous collection of craft and initiation into the wondrous ways of e Naval Dockyard.
(c) Due to number of new ships refitting necessity to send half-trained officers to seɛ. thereby interrupting their training and, at the same time, throwing more work and responsibility on trained officers.
(d) Officers transferred to other naval services and replaced.
(e) Disorganisation due to failure of some, in fact most, of the old
A.P.V's to stand up to unaccustomed heavy duty.
(1) No cocking facilities in ships. Improvised living quarters.
(e) During the last six months the worst weather ever experienced in
Hong Kong, in ships providing inɛdequate shelter.
(h) In the flotilla there are single right, single left, twin inturning
and twin cutturning screws surely world record for cne flotillɛ.
ge 9
Pa
Pa
-2-
CONFIDENT I A L. (A.S.R. 71/40)
10
(1) The transfer of headquarters from H.M.S. "Cornflower" to the new
H.M.S. "Cornflower" and the months of preparatory work required. (j) The hazard of typhoons (1ortunately nore really severe) and the
attendant disruption of petrols and re-adjustment to a new roster.
(k) Variety of guns to fight and minesweeping gear to use.
(1) The embarkation for evacuation cf cur wives and families carried
cut by an or anisation prepared by curselves.
(m) Many of us long overdue for Home Leave (that is a hurdle which we cannot expect to clear until after the wor) and duties so arducus that local leave has been almost impossible.
(n) The loss of cur Officer Instructor to the Royal Navy last October and the organisation and training of new mobilized members under- taken by volunteer officers, a duty which had never been envisaged. (c) The formation, expansion and training in the evenings of the newly-
formed European Seamen Gunners Branch in addition to training of other unmobilized members.
(2) To H.K.R.M.V.R. We given the duty of carrying out Admiralty Equip-
ment and Running Trials of M/S gear of R.C.S. "VITI".
(q) The setting up of a base at Middle Island where we established our
own Signal Station and W/T communications and operated as a detached unit during Combined Operations.
(r) The organisation by curselves of attacks on the Island during
Combined Operations - in cne instance with fourteen ships in two divisions.
There was one hurdle we did not clear, that was the maintaining of the Examination Service by H.K.R.N.V.R. Officers. The need for four more patrols ceme when the minefields were laid and we had insufficient officers to undertake both duties. Five of cur master mariner officers were however given commissions in the k.N.R. and the balance required for the Examination Service was recruited by the Naval Authorities. Later as numbers gradually built-up we ɛɛve in lieu seven officers to other naval services as mentioned in (d).
When we look back to 1934 we realize that we have travelled a long long way.
A word about the future
We are impatient to be "in it" at home.
Our urmobilized members want to be mobilized. All over the Empire unmobilized men went to be mobilized; mobilized men want active engagement with the enemy. This World War is today being actively fought by a privileged few ε handful of H.M. Ships, R.A.F. planes and A.A. Batteries. It is also being fought less spectacularly but no less decisively by others of whom we are part.
Those who served in the last wer
war than this one has yet proved to be
-
which was far more & "Contact" know how seldom the average man
over is in contact with the enemy even in the famous Dover patrol of the last war. He knows these weeks, months, years of waiting and the self-discipline entailed,
10
10Page 11