27
British shipping; it amounts to a convenience, but little
more, to British merchents;
གིས་མ་བ་
(#) It is imposs ble to consider the Jaɛnnese proɔosals
except as an extension o the alunt-ėkasnki
gre:mnt of
July 4th and subjees in particular to elnuse ? of that
(3) This partial reopening therefore is not worth considering
except for four reasons 1-
(4)
(1) as the first step towards the full reopening of the River in the hope that there will be an ad- vande within not more thna tho months to the next stage of at least four British sailings a week with jammengers and cargo between Canton à Hong Kong, with the abolition of all metion of sailings;
(11) The hope of a further early extension to peroză. €
exporta and im›orks by British coasters}
(111) The Japanese have in de a gosture, which they pro-
fess to be (and I think imi genuine, by whai ch they lay store, and refusal to reach an agreement my omune (or aggravate) Anglo-Japanese friction generally
(iv) Pailure to reach an agree:ent vill possible post-
pone correspondingly the reopening of the year】 River and the restoration of British shi, ping and trade.
The alleged, and in my opinion true, reason for the
mumerous militery and naval restrictions is to keep a chank
on all cɛrno invested and exported. and to verit no material
leakage into er frea progqupied China.
Consequently it is
inevitable, und : believe unavoidable, that the Japanese
rai litery authorities will insist
a. on drastic restriction of elnemes of goods permitted;
on pervita from the Superintendent of of course their nominee;
ust
*, who is
on Japanese military "guards" to watch the rovements of all cargo imported or exported;
d. on much registration of lighters and oergo soolies na
they think will ensure a zaånårmas of "lenka
In this connection, the points are how far are these restrict:
reasonɛble in an area over which the Japanese military have