It seems to me
33
and rejected.
The matter in this
Zap. (2) (3A) on 53652/1/35
way
That dealing with
will result in the
Income Tax, or alternative laxation, whe adopted, being darted regarded as raised entirely for the purpose of making a gift to HMG. rl should have thought that that was to be avoided if possible.
It also occurs to me that the under- bying idea of the last part of (21) is that the main purpose is must be to spend money for the sake of spending it. "If w can't have avoplanes, let us have ships, but at all events let us & buy something,
or at
rate get
This attitude may
OW
n'd of have
we
Some money
ober
een engendered
circular telegrams, but I doubt
whether it is absolutely essential.
The problems raised in (21) are political, financial Recmerave and military. Any haste about the financial "soft" can only arise from military necessity, and are of the first tures of action seems to be to determine The urgency and value of the extendive proposed, which is a matter for the ope. or Service Depts. It seems practicable to make the political problem ie. Whether to Save the principle of income lavy, and what to sacrifice in doing it - stand by itselt. The other hand, it it had to be assumed
heavy
That/early expenditure is essential and cannot be financed from Surplus balances,
revenue
Then the quickest method of raising must be adopted, and as it is certainly not income tax, the latter might as well be dropped at once. The local opposition seems to be not to the raising of additional reven-
for the war, but to the means by whith it is proposed to be done. But I assume
ne
[' that