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and not afraid to accept Russian help in any way that he can get it. He is at the same time determined that Sinkiang shall remain part of China, and he gives his whole-hearted support to China as against the Japanese. He will not accept help from any country that he suspects as he suspects Great Britain-of imperialism, and as long as that suspicion lasts he will keep all foreigners out of Sinkiang. I neither saw nor heard anything that led me to suppose that Russia was taking advantage of her position to force her control upon Sinkiang, but, on the other hand, for reasons explained above, her influence must be very great.
Tokyo Visit.
160. My stay in Japan was short and was limited to a few days in Tokyo, a few in Formosa, and I also spent one day at Canton on the way back. I managed to spend most of my time in Tokyo in meeting Japanese of various liberal view-points. I stayed at the British Embassy at Tokyo, and naturally therefore contacted mainly those who were at least not anti-British. I should imagine that, in any event, it would be very difficult to see or obtain any opinions from this latter class. Both the Ministers of War and Marine refused to see me, but the Foreign Minister Arita and the Vice-Minister Tano both gave me long interviews. The Prime Minister was prepared to see me, but owing to the Diet being in session it was unfortunately impossible to arrange a time. I also saw Baron Shidohara, who was Foreign Minister until December 1931, Mr. Yoshida, who was Ambassador in London, and Mr. Kato, the Ambassador at Large to China, who happened to be in Tokyo. In addition to these I saw a number of other politicians, members of the Diet, journalists, &c. I made no attempt to see the commercial community. I had a number of talks with Sir Robert and Lady Craigie, and I also spent some time with Ambassador Grew. The only British commercial man with whom I talked was Mr. Spicer, who was in charge of Butterfield and Swire's Yokohama office in the absence of Mr. Thayer.
161. Sir Robert Craigie has had a very hard and anxious time for the last two and a half years, and has undoubtedly worked unremittingly to avoid any breakdown of relations.
*
162. The first thing that struck me in Tokyo was the extraordinarily wide difference between the charming Japanese civilians in Japan and the terrible behaviour of the military in China. There is no doubt that there are two nations in Japan to-day-the liberal-minded intelligentsia, including a number of the leading politicians, on the one hand, and the autocratic reactionary militarists on the other. The former desire to wind up the " China incident" provided they can save face," and they are persuading themselves that this can be done through the device of setting up Wang Ching-wei as a new Central Government. I do not think they really have much faith or hope that Wang can ever be strong enough to do anything on his own, though they profess the belief that they will be able to withdraw gradually as soon as his régime is established. The opinion of those whom I questioned in Canton and who were in a position to know the reactions of the Chinese to the puppet régimes was quite definitely that Wang would be no more than another puppet, and that, apart from self-interested Chinese, he had practically no support and would consequently have to rely on the Japanese entirely. In Canton no one pays the least attention to the Puppet Government, and the Japanese control everything. I append a note(") about conditions in Canton.
C
163. Most of the Japanese I met have said to me quite frankly that there can be no solution of the incident so long as the military are in political control, and even the Foreign Minister was prepared to acknowledge the undesirability of the behaviour of the military elements in China. There are various estimates of the likelihood or possibility of a Liberal régime of strength replacing the military, but a good many of them are, I think, wish-thinking and their thoughts are not based on any solid foundation. It is undoubtedly true that the people are getting restless under economic difficulties and disappointment at the long-drawn-out war not being concluded. There are many estimates as to the capacity of the Japanese to hold out economically, and these, too, vary very greatly. The official view is that though the people may be inconvenienced, as in any country at war, there is not the least danger of economic collapse. Others
(*) Not printed.
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say that something must be done this year if it is to be avoided. One of the main difficulties, according to the view of the American agricultural expert whom we met in Formosa, is the acute shortage this year of the artificial manures upon which they have relied very largely in the past. This shortage is estimated at about 20 per cent., and desperate efforts are being made now to remedy the position. I do not myself believe that there is likely to be any economic collapse for a long time, especially bearing in mind the capacity of the Japanese to suffer in the cause of national patriotism. It was certainly very striking how much conversation we heard in all quarters, but particularly among Europeans, about the shortage in all kinds of commodities. This was even more pronounced in Formosa than in Tokyo, and was in strong contrast to the complete absence of any such complaints in Western China.
164. In the result I do not see, nor could I get anyone to tell me, how the military control, which is an essential part of Japanese social and political life, is to be disposed of. If there were to be any sort of uprising of the people it is quite probable that a violent military dictatorship would be established. The present Government is regarded as stable, probably till next year, unless some major incident occurs which upsets it, but it is not regarded as a strong Govern- ment, and is certainly not in a position to challenge the military control. The incident of Saito's speech in the Diet is still much talked of, and his attitude supported, and the fact that the speech was made and Saito's expulsion from the Diet opposed by a section of the Minsaito party may indicate a possible break in the political situation. As I was not able to see any of the militarists. I can only state their objectives as disclosed by others and by their actions.
165. Everyone I met admitted in some degree the demoralisation of the Japanese soldiery and officers that has taken place in China and the squeeze and corruption in which they are indulging. This unfortunately gives them an economic vested interest to remain in China as long as possible. On the other hand, they will never take direct responsibility for anything political if they can possibly avoid it. It is their policy to control through puppets in Japan, as elsewhere, so that the puppets can get the blame and the political knocks and blows which result from the policies ordered by the militarists. They hope to do the same thing, in my view, by the setting up of the Wang Government. I do not believe they have the slightest idea of using it, as the Liberals would wish, as a face-saving device to permit withdrawal, but rather as a true puppet which will enable the Japanese army to remain in control in China. This control in China will always give the militarists strong power in Japan, even if they become unpopular there.
166. I append my notes() of my interviews with Arita and Tano as I believe that both these Ministers spoke to me fairly frankly. One of the great difficulties with the Japanese--and this was especially emphasised to me by Grew -is that they will genuinely and honestly persuade themselves that black is white and, once they have done so, they proceed to build arguments upon that entirely false premise, which makes it impossible to convince them.
167. It is quite clear, I think, that at present there is no possibility of any negotiations between Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese, and the setting up of the Wang régime will not make such negotiations any easier. There must therefore be a continuance of hostilities for a considerable time as there is no means of bringing them to an end and saving the face of both sides. During that time the Japanese will no doubt do all they can to compel Great Britain to minimise its help to China. This policy will be pursued by Liberals and militarists alike, but I do not think that the Liberals will desire or allow any action that would break the link with Great Britain. Japan's major preoccupa- tion is her fear of Soviet Russia and of a Soviet-Chinese alliance against Japan. As long as this fear exists she will be very chary indeed of breaking with any nation that might possibly be an ally against Russia, and at the present time she so regards Great Britain.
168. I think it is essential that we should do all we can to encourage, and
to keep on friendly terms with, the Japanese Liberals, and this our ambassador is doing to the utmost. On the other hand, I do not believe that these elements really object to a firm attitude being taken over the China affair by Great Britain or America. In fact, Grew told me that the reaction to his now famous speech was on the whole one of relief and not antagonism so far as many of the Liberal (*) Not printed.
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