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become less effective as military units with their lengthening periods of service in China. They get drawn into the corruption of the military machine which there exists and, from all accounts, their troops are not now as good fighting units as they were at the beginning of the hostilities. The Chinese troops, on the other hand, due to their longer period of training and especially to the fact that their officers are now better qualified, are becoming more effective. The Chinese Government has taken special steps to increase the efficiency of the mobile and guerrilla units, and has set up a number of establishments where the officers of these units are given special instruction in that type of warfare.
Chinese Air Force.
34. There has in the past been a great deal of corruption among some of the senior members of the air force connected with the supply of planes, and this has been associated with the name of Mr. Pawley, the American supplier, who is president of the Inter-Continent Corporation and connected with Curtiss- Wright and other American corporations. An attempt was made by Mme. Chiang and Donald to clean this up, but it failed to a great extent as the Generalissimo could not see his way to getting rid of so many trained and skilled personnel from the air force at a critical time.
35. The size of the air force is extremely small, and the general account of the capabilities of the pilots is not good. The American chief instructor at Yunnan gave me a very poor impression of the material that he was getting to train, and said that the pilots failed in emergency though they were quite competent when flying to rule in ordinary circumstances. There is a great deal of training proceeding at a number of centres, and there is a fair supply of training planes. The actual fighters and bombers are, I gather, used comparatively seldom as they are kept for the protection of particularly vital points like Nanning and Chungking.
36. So far the production of Chinese planes must be very small indeed. One factory at Nanning is producing and Lowing has just come into production, while another factory is being built in Sinkiang for the Central Government. The Lowing factory, which we visited, is being extremely efficiently organised and run by an American staff, and should soon be producing one aeroplane a day with power to increase the production.
37. The Chinese air force cannot be of any real assistance in deciding the fate of the war. The best it can do is to hamper somewhat the activities of the Japanese and cause them considerable losses in the air. But it is not very efficient even for its strength as it loses a great deal of its effectiveness through corruption and bad pilots.
38. In civil aviation, of which we had considerable experience, we found the Chinese pilots superior to the Russian, who did nothing but contact-flying and had no direction-finding apparatus nor, apparently, any knowledge of navigation. The result was that they could not fly above the clouds or in cloudy or snowy weather. This resulted in unending delays, and on our return flight from Moscow it was not until we got into the area flown by Chinese pilots, which is much more difficult, that we were able to get along quickly without undue delays. The Chinese pilots struck us as competent and courageous, and certainly their record of freedom from accidents compared with the bad record of the Russian pilots in China would make them seem superior.
Political.
39. The present Government of China is a party Government by the Kuomintang, which consists of branches and individual members organised some- what on the lines of the Communist party in Russia, but very different in its discipline, objectives and methods. Theoretically and to some extent in practice too other parties are permitted to exist, but the only rival party now in operation is the Communist, if exception is made for Sinkiang and those provinces or parts of provinces which lie behind the Japanese lines. The Kuomintang does not exercise a rigid discipline in any way, and its relationship to its members is much more like that in the British Labour party than in a Communist party. The party control of the Government is, however, of the totalitarian type, and its influence through the police, army, youth organisations and educational institu- tions is much greater than would be possible in any democratic country. Those
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at present in control of the Kuomintang party machine are undoubtedly bent upon the wiping out of all opposition to their power, by force if need be, and are of a reactionary type. I certainly gained the impression that they paid nothing but lip service to the principles of the Chinese revolution, and that they were in reality bent on preserving many of the less desirable incidents of the old régime which would give them personal power and, in some cases, wealth.
40.
In this connexion it is necessary to deal in a little detail with the Generalissimo and his peculiar position in China. He is in the position to become an absolute autocrat under existing circumstances. He has the almost universal support of the people so long as he leads China against Japanese aggression. It seems at times that he underestimates the strength of his own position and fails to carry through changes that he wishes to see because of his fear of jeopardising his position of leadership. He is certainly indispensable to China at the present time and is without doubt the only person who could hold China together at all. There is no other person amongst the Ministers or outside the governmental circles who even looks like being able to succeed him should a successor become necessary. He is not in sympathy with the extreme attitude taken up by the party controllers of the Kuomintang. I had an example of this with regard to a circular sent out from the north-western headquarters of the party dealing with the extinction of the Communists. I set out an English extract from this in the appendix.(") I pointed out to one of his lieutenants (Han Lih-wu) the extreme undesirability of such action, and he told me, after seeing the Generalissimo, that this had not his approval, and that he had definitely refused to allow its issue, but that somehow or other it had got out and that the Generalissimo was anxious for an accommodation with the Communists. I instance this as showing that apparently the connexion between the Generalissimo and the party control is not as close as some might believe, especially in the outlying provinces. The trouble is that the lieutenants he has appointed, for instance as Governors, are not men of the new type but men with the old war-lord mentality. He is, too, unfortunately surrounded and largely influenced by a clique of younger officers under the War Minister and Vice- Minister, who seem as anxious to destroy the Communists, and so Chinese unity, as to defeat Japan. My own estimate of the Generalissimo is that he has great qualities of leadership, that he has an attachment to autocratic military methods and feudalism which he finds it difficult to overcome, that he is very oriental in the workings of his mind, and that, though intelligent and willing and able to learn, he knows very little of finance and industrial matters. He is primarily a military leader and is more at home in that side of affairs than in the more complex financial, transport and industrial matters. He has a good knowledge and appreciation of international affairs, and though not hostile to Great Britain, he is extremely disappointed with the present attitude of our Government, and that disappointment might easily turn into hostility if it continues. He has little, if any, appreciation of democratic politics, though he does quite sincerely desire to see democracy of a suitable form in China. He has, I am certain, a desire to improve the honesty and efficiency of the Administration, but he is not at present prepared to take those steps as to change of personnel which are essential. Donald's view is that he is perfectly genuine in his determination to make changes, but that he will bide his time until he considers the right opportunity offers for such a change. My own fear, on this assumption, is that he may delay the matter for too long.
The
41. Under the principles laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen there was to be a period of tutelage for the people during which they should become instructed in democratic methods, prior to the actual introduction of democracy. war has, of course, interfered with this development, but, nevertheless, it has been decided, upon the instigation of the People's Political Council, to introduce the new democratic Constitution by means of an elected Constituent Assembly this autumn, and active preparations are now going forward in this direction. I append the latest draft(2) of the Constitution as it will come before the Con- stituent Assembly. The present Constitution is substantially totalitarian, in that the Kuomintang controls the Executive Yuan through the National Defence Council, which is a purely party body, and so controls all Administration. Every Minister is a member of the Kuomintang, though it is not compulsory and, at times, there have been Ministers who, were not members. Only about a third
(2) Not printed.
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