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convenient excuse for those and there are a number of them-who desire to retain the old vices of the Administration. In spite of this, it is, I think, certain that the effect of the Japanese aggression and its extreme brutality of method has been to rally the entire nation, apart from the puppets, behind the Generalissimo and to make it easier for him and those who think like him to get rid of the evil traditions of the past. A typical case is the opium traffic in Szechuan, which was extremely bad a year or two ago, and which now, by the patient and persistent work which the Generalissimo, in his office of Governor of Szechuan, has performed, has nearly been done away with.
21. The other important aspect of the Chinese character in the present situation is its infinite capacity for patient resistance, suffering and cheerful resilience under difficulties which would entirely overwhelm other peoples. The quite incredible bestiality of the Japanese bombing in practically every open town in China has to be seen to be believed. Tens of thousands of civilians have been killed or wounded by bombs and burnt by fires started by the bombing. The Chinese quite deliberately do not jeopardise their own scanty supply of aircraft by attempting to defend these towns, as they consider they can better afford to lose a few hundred thousand civilians than even a few precious aero- planes, which are kept for the defence of the key points of industry. This action by the Japanese has not in the least destroyed the morale of the Chinese defence. Indeed, it has almost certainly increased it and made the Chinese more determined to fight to the end. When cities or parts of them are destroyed the inhabitants patiently proceed with their work in a perfectly fatalistic way, and do not even show any violent or excessive bitterness against the Japanese. It is almost disconcerting the way they go off into peals of laughter when recounting some of the Japanese exploits, out of which they manage, as out of everything, to extract humour.
22 This attitude is apt to make them so careless of consequences that they fail to take the steps open to them to protect their vital points of economic and transport importance. A typical case is the Haiphong Railway, the bridges of which have never been adequately protected by anti-aircraft guns of any type. It is true that they have very few such guns available, but there is no doubt that more could have been done in the way of protection before the bombing took place. I understand that the French Ambassador gave the Chinese specific warning that the bridges should be protected some six months before the first bombing, but nothing was done. I, myself, discussed this matter with General Lung, the Governor of Yunnan, who is the responsible authority, and he assured me that everything possible would be done, but shortly after fresh bombing took place where there was no protection. It is fair to say that there are many points of danger on the railway, such as the bridges over steep, narrow gorges, and it may be that the supply of guns was not available, though the general opinion seems to be that something more effective might have been done. Now at last a more efficient anti-aircraft service has been placed on the railway, but much valuable time has been lost. I had a similar experience as regards a very important alcohol factory about 100 miles from Chengtu which was wholly unprotected and placed in a very exposed spot. When I discussed this matter with the Acting Governor of Szechuan at Chengtu, he assured me that the planes from Chengtu could give the protection. This was obviously impracticable, owing to distance and the scarcity of planes. He will no doubt wait hopefully until the factory is bombed before taking steps to protect it.
23. It must also be remembered that the industrially effective free China is now situated in the extreme west, an area which till a short time ago was only reached (with the exception of a city like Chungking on a navigable river) by pack ponies or chairs. Places like Paoshan or Talifu in Yunnan or Lanchow and Yunnan was Suchow in Kansu are to-day exactly as they were 1.000 years ago.
in a sense only nominally a part of China, and was, in effect, almost as indepen- dent as Tibet. Szechuan, which is the backbone of resistance in China to-day, was slightly more developed so far as Chungking and Chengtu were concerned, but beyond these two cities it was entirely untouched by any modern ideas. The north-western provinces were even less accessible by reason of the long winter snows and the extremely mountainous nature of the country. What is being attempted is to convert these very backward agrarian and mountainous areas into an industrial base for Chinese resistance to Japan. There are very many millions of refugees from the east who have come back to these areas, especially
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those who were skilled in various crafts and manufactures. In addition, considerable quantities of machinery of all kinds have been brought back by river, road or railway, often being carried by man-power. This body of labour and management and the machinery salvaged from the eastern factories has made the problem less difficult, as it means that a great deal of machinery and labour is available which would otherwise be lacking. But the fundamental difficulty remains of the industrialisation of a backward area, while at the same time a major war is being carried on,
Men as
24. The one inexhaustible asset of China is her man-power. labourers and as beasts of burden have accomplished feats which would be unthinkable in any other country. Driving up the Burma Road, which was completed in just under twelve months and is probably one of the longest mountain roads in the world, one is aghast at the achievement of the builders, who had no single mechanical device to assist them in their task-not even a steam-roller. Thousands of bridges and culverts were built, tens of thousands of tons of rock cut down and removed by hand, and millions of cubic feet of earth must have been shifted. The building was done by unpaid labour, and the labourers even supplied their own food. When it is remembered that some 100 miles are in an area infested with mosquitoes whose bite is often fatal within This twenty-four hours, it will be realised what a superhuman task this was. spring they have a force of 72,000 paid labourers repairing the road, putting in permanent stone bridges and some 3,000 permanent culverts to prevent wash-outs during the wet season. The Chinese, too, are the most wonderful improvisers. They can do almost anything with bamboo poles and a sufficient number of coolies. They will even carry a locomotive along a road or pick a bridge out of a river into which it has fallen. At such work they are not only efficient, but extremely quick.
25. It is this great reserve of patiently working man-power (and woman- and child-power too) that gives one the feeling that China is unconquerable despite all the difficulties in her administration and any other drawbacks of the Chinese character.
26. There is one other factor which is universally observed and commented upon by foreigners and by the younger Chinese themselves. Politeness is an essential foundation of the Chinese character, and no official will be so rude as to disagree openly with any suggestion put forward. The ready and grateful acceptance of these is apt to mislead people into the belief that something will be done about the suggestion when there is no such intention whatsoever. Not only so, but the Chinese themselves are great planners, in the sense that they are always putting forward and agreeing to extensive plans of all kinds, and very many of them remain nothing but plans and never reach the stage of execution. Having planned something they sit back satisfied. This is partly due to an inherent incapacity to exert themselves unduly in a positive direction, and perhaps even more because the carrying out of each and every plan offers innumerable
"face," opportunities for sabotage on the basis of " squeeze or
and the attitude of mind and effort that are required to drive through such difficulties are not part of the normal Chinese character. At present, with the existing Executive Yuan and the Ministers, there are too many of the old type in power and in the Administration to permit the representatives of the New China to have their way. As one of the younger Chinese administrators remarked to me: Though I am a peaceful man and do not as a rule approve of violence or of shooting individuals, there will have to be a great many more shootings in China before the difficulty is overcome." So far shootings of individuals have been practically limited to military personalities who have made grave blunders or acted traitorously, or to political opponents such as the Communists at the instigation of the Kuomintang in the more remote provinces, but some drastic form of action is required (not shooting, I trust) if the Administration is to cope adequately with its problems.
Military Position.
27. It is extremely difficult to appreciate the full significance of the military situation in China without the assistance of detailed maps showing the disposition of the various forces. I was fortunate enough to be shown about the middle of January by General Ho, the War Minister, and his Chief of Staff all the latest and most confidential maps of the Chinese staff, giving the exact position as it
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