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could to assist his Government. We were at the same time bound to have many other considerations in mind, and I hoped that his Government would not lose sight of the fact that we had from the commencement of the struggle given assistance of no mean order to China by keeping open the route through Hong Kong
7. I noticed in his memorandum (1) a suggestion that the United Kingdom was allowing arms and war materials to be supplied to Japan. So far as I knew, there was no foundation for this suggestion. The Ambassador acknowledged that this part of the note was not applicable to Great Britain, except in so far as he believed we were permitting oil and steel to reach Japan. I told his Excellency that I would have this enquired into, but that I did not suppose that the oil reaching Japan was oil over which we had any power to exercise direct control. He mentioned the fact that Canada had been supplying minerals to Japan, and I told him that this was not in our power to deal with.
8. Finally, I assured the Ambassador that we were very conscious of all the considerations that he had urged both as concerning our own immediate interests and as concerning the larger issues that were being fought out in this unhappy struggle. I said that I would take steps to inform myself in greater detail of the several lines of action along which he had said that the State Department of the United States were moving.
Enclosure.
(1)
Memorandum.
I am, &c.
HALIFAX.
ON the 30th September. 1938, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a report on the Chinese Government appeal under article 17, the effect of which was to declare that the provisions of article 16, regarding sanctions against an aggressor State, are applicable in the circumstances of the conflict now raging between China and Japan. It was declared that China had a right to the sympathy and aid of the other members of the League, and that grave inter- national tension elsewhere must not make them forget the sufferings of the Chinese people, or their own duty of doing nothing that might weaken China's power of resistance or their undertaking to consider how far they can individually
extend aid to China.
On the basis of this report the Chinese Government now once again addresses its request to His Majesty's Government to implement their commitments under the successive resolutions of the League of Nations by immediate and positive
measures.
Among these, the most urgent measure the Chinese Government ventures to suggest is that His Majesty's Government declare an embargo on the supply of all arms and war materials to Japan. If, for difficulties of legislation or other practical considerations, such measure cannot be forthwith put into operation, the Chinese Government nevertheless expresses its desire that His Majesty's Government will use their influence of persuasion on the British manufacturers and export merchants to refrain from further supplying the Japanese, directly or indirectly, with arms and war materials, particularly aeroplanes, oil and steel. In this connexion it may be pointed out that some time ago the United States Government made known its attitude that no aeroplanes should be sold to Japan by American manufacturers, and the effect of this has been appreciable. It is anticipated that the United States Government will soon be in a position to express a similar attitude with regard to other forms of arms and war materials. The French Government has also introduced an embargo on the export from Indo-China of certain ores of which Japan has hitherto been the principal consumer. Therefore the Chinese Government fervently hopes that His Majesty's Government, both in consideration of their obligations as a member State of the League of Nations and also in view of their close relations with China other- wise, will not fail to take the most effective measures to assist China in her struggle for national existence and orderly international relations.
3
It may be added that the above request of the Chinese Government is given even more cogency and urgency by the latest events in South China. The Japanese war machine has already started its long-threatened invasion of Kwangtung, and the consequent danger to Hong Kong and British interests in South China need not be emphasised. The Chinese Government feels that Japan embarks on this bold step in the belief that Great Britain will, in all circumstances and in spite of encroachments upon British interests, observe only a passive neutrality. It is submitted that such acts of aggression on the part of Japan, allowed to go unchecked, are already undermining and eventually will destroy all British interests in South China, and that only a firm stand by Great Britain towards the aggressor and effective immediate assistance to China can contribute to the alleviation of the present situation.
Chinese Embassy, London, October 17, 1938.
(Confidential.)
(2)
Memorandum.
I AM requested by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to communicate the following views on the Japanese invasion of South China, and to ask His Majesty's Government to permit his confidential observations on the situation as it involves British policy :-
*
Japan's invasion of Kwangtung, marking as it does the inauguration of Japan's policy of southward expansion, is obviously not directed against China only but is designed to test Great Britain's attitude."
If Great Britain should place any reliance on Japan's empty phrases of respect for foreign rights and interests and adopts an attitude that Japan can construe as either weak or wavering, then Japan's present rulers will regard all British territories and interests in the Western Pacific area as objectives for absorption, once Japan has secured a base in South China.
Japan's bold southward thrust is manifestly the materialisation of her anti- British policy. Consequently, the community of interest at this juncture between Great Britain and China is real and close. It therefore devolves on Great Britain to give China substantial aid, on the one hand, and, on the other, to take a firm stand against the pretensions of Japan.
Parallel action with the United States and France would seem to be called for by all the threatened international interests in that area.
Japan's power and resources are by now greatly spent after encountering China's stout resistance for fourteen months, and therefore Japan is not in a position to cope with another major conflict. Clear proofs of this are Japan's retreat in face of the comparatively firm stand by France in connexion with the Hainan Island area and by the Soviet Union in the Changkufeng affair.
Japan's bold move on South China at this juncture is inspired by the belief of ruling groups in Japan that they are correct in their own interpretation of the dislike and dread of war manifested by Great Britain during the recent European crisis. Japan therefore believes she sees an opportunity to make a test, in the hope that Great Britain will reluctantly acquiesce in her manoeuvre.
If Great Britain, however, knowing well that Japan is not in a position to extend her military liabilities by becoming involved with third parties, will adopt a resolute course toward the Japanese threats to her territories and interests, then Japan will undoubtedly accept the check.
The truculence of Japan towards Great Britain is such that the situation in the near future must be that Great Britain will find herself constrained, in association with other democratic Powers, to bring about the permanent check to Japan's predatory ambitions in Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific, or else Japan, in combination with certain other countries, will proceed with its serious threat to the integrity of the British Empire.
It seems, Generalissimo Chiang begs to be allowed to state frankly, that Great Britain has really arrived at a moment when a decision on this point can no longer be deferred.
Chinese Embassy, London,
October 17, 1938.
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