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to sell. The Ambassador replied that he fully understood our position. Perhaps, however, we might have some older aeroplanes surplus to our requirements which we could sell, or perhaps, again, the Admiralty could help by selling one or two submarines. On my explaining that these latter took a year or more to build, his Excellency replied that perhaps we had some which we should be getting rid of normally and which could be sold to China. Dr. Quo went on to argue that the Chinese Government and people were putting up a vigorous resistance which they intended to continue, and it was to the interest of His Majesty's Government to do all they could to help them. He fully realised how much had been done already, and he was sure that I would understand the spirit in which he made his request.
5. His Excellency added that he was in communication with Captain Ball and was hoping to obtain some armaments through his good offices. If we were able to arrange this, the Ambassador hoped very much that the War Office would give what assistance they could to Captain Ball, who. I understood, was connected with the Soley Arms Company.
6. I then reminded the Ambassador that some time ago he had asked us about the possibility of completing the road to the Chinese frontier in Burma. I had explained that we were ready to do this, but so far his Excellency had not told me to what point on the frontier the Chinese Government were constructing the road on their side. I understood that only a mile of our road remained to be constructed, but that a far longer stretch was still required on the Chinese side. His Excellency replied that he thought my information was correct and he would communicate with his Government and let me know the result.
7. The Ambassador then asked me what were my views as to a meeting of the Committee of Twenty-Three while the Council was sitting at Geneva in January. He had been asked by his Government to obtain my views on this matter. I asked his Excellency what it was contemplated that the Committee of Twenty-Three should do. Dr. Quo replied that he thought much depended on the progress in Anglo-American relations. He quite realised this was a vital element in the Far Eastern situation. If we considered that these relations were developing satisfactorily and that a meeting at Geneva would do more harm than good, his Government would readily understand. At the same time, I would appreciate that public opinion in China might expect him and his colleague in Paris to be active in Geneva, and might not understand if no further meeting of the Committee of Twenty-Three took place. Ilis Excellency continued that there were many who held the view that, if the League would give a lead in the imposition of some sanctions, then the United States would follow and join in. I asked the Ambassador whether that was his own appreciation of the situation. I myself was very doubtful whether it was accurate. agreed with him that the really important matter was Anglo-American co-operation. This had developed in a very satisfactory manner in recent weeks, but I was doubtful whether, if the League were to impose a sanction, the effect in this respect would be good, Moreover, was there in truth any sanction which the League could make effective? The Ambassador mentioned oil, and said that an economist such as Dr. Salter had told him that, in his view, in six months an oil sanction could be made effective. I replied that our information made it clear that this was not so and that Dr. Salter had greatly under-estimated the time necessary.
8. I understood the Dutch representative had made it known at Geneva that his Government were not prepared to put on an oil sanction. However that might be. I felt sure it would not be fair to ask the Dutch Government to impose such a sanction unless the Governments in a position to do so-the United States Government and ourselves-were willing to defend the Dutch possessions in case of need.
9. The Ambassador admitted the force of what I had said, and repeated that the last thing that he wished to do was to impede the development of Auglo- American co-operation.
10. His Excellency said that the Japanese advance had had, as one result, that literally millions of Chinese had left their land and had moved further into the interior in order to avoid the horrors of the Japanese invasion. This had resulted in a large part of the country not being cultivated, and there would in consequence be much impoverishment and perhaps a shortage of food.
11. After some further conversation about the meeting of the Council at Geneva, I told his Excellency that I was not prepared to dissuade his Government
from calling a meeting of the Committee of Twenty-Three if they so wished, but only thought it necessary to point out the difficulty which I saw in a meeting taking place with nothing resulting from it. It was agreed that I should consult Sir R. Lindsay in Washington and his Excellency should consult his Chinese colleague in the same capital and ascertain what likely reactions were to be expected there. I also suggested that it might be well if the Ambassador and his colleague in Paris were to content themselves for the moment with a decision to go to Geneva for the meeting of the Council, when they could have conversations with M. Delbos, M. Litvinov and myself. and then decide upon the desirability or otherwise of calling together the Committee of Twenty-Three.
I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN.
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