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the scheme was to be regarded as incompatible with the
"neutral position which the Colony should maintain at present
"and which it would be obliged to maintain were the existence
"of a state of war to be recognised in the future", and the
last paragraph of those instructions (in F 7262) would seem
to preclude the aeroplanes being flown off even unarmed.
In this matter, therefore, we have in a sense detrimental
to China's interests gone further than we need have.
(5) This raises the question of the League Resolution,
which recommended that members "should refrain from taking
"any action which might have the effect of weakening China's
"power of resistance
and should also consider
Mr.
"how far they can individually extend aid to China".
Fitzmaurice interprets this as meaning that members of the
League should not take any action to cut China off from
normal and usual facilities, and, as shown above, our
instructions to Hong Kong can probably be held to have
restricted such facilities.
(6) The question is therefore whether those instructions
should be reversed or modified. One would naturally like to
do so, quite apart from our obligations arising out of the
League Resolution. But it has to be remembered that if
effective supplies of aircraft and other war material are
seen to be passing through Hong Kong, it is likely that the
Japanese will tighten their blockade measures. The
proclamation by Japan of a state of war, to which she might
be driven in the circumstances, and the arrogation to herself
of belligerent rights, would be a serious matter for British
shipping in the Far East.
(7) We therefore have to balance the desirability of
retaining Chinese goodwill against the risk of seeing
ourselves