15.
At the meeting on 17/12/37/ asted N. Sial of the Adunatt what wow happens if we had a haval patrol, and if that patiol owned a Japanese warship not b Enty H.K. Qruitorial waters, & the Japanen warship ignored the adu and Entured. The ausum was that the officer nichays of the patiol wow not use force, but would surely report the weather to the C. unc. My reply wass
"The the Japaure uols at once say: "The British Navy is a said to fill.
That was not disputed.
The long short of the matter is that if he had not disarmed we should hun ham forned owireles in this decadfully himiliating
paitim.
4.D.
as perposed
Jom at mu
"fairly invertebrate". The view taken, as lundustand it, was that as our feet, or a sufliciruth, large part of it, cannot be sent to China, and as America s not prepared to help, it would to the height of folly to pursue a polier which, in the conditions at present obtaining,
might well and (1) in the annihilation
ui Far Eastern
of on small naval force mi watus 4 the Japanese fleet, and (2) in the consequent loss of Hong Kong and of one whole prestige in the East.
18.04.
17/12/37 11. Duncan.
I agree with Mr Duncan.
JHalder
17-12-37
The situation is not one in which either the
C.0. or the Government of Hong Kong can influence
the decision in the slightest; but Mr Duncan's
minute seems to imply that, if the Japanese want to ☛
use Hong Kong territory or territorial waters for
any purpose, we must acquiesce. This is probably
treu; but the position would not have been otherwise
if China had been victorious and had become a
powerfully armed state. We furnish these eastern
nations with high explosive, and show intense
surprise when there is an explosion.
#Rlowell
18-12-3