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All
to sustain a conflict with the Japanese fleet.
that a British patrolling destroyer could do would
be to give a warning to any Japanese warship, and
if it were not obeyed, to retire ignominiously.
The general sense of the meeting, with the doubtful
exception of the representative of the Fastern
comsicha Department of the Foreign Office, seemed to reengnise
that these were conclusive grounds for declining to
recommend the establishment of a patrol as recommended
by the Commodore. The conclusion was that all that
could be safely recommended to higher authority in
the Foreign Office and the Admiralty was that a
protest should be sent to the Japanese Government,
and it was considered doubtful whether it was worth
while requesting that the Commander of the Japanese
warship concerned should be recalled. The Admiralty
will also telegraph to the Naval Commander-in-Chief
to inform him of the protest which was to be made,
and to explain to him that his suggestion for the
denial to Chinese Maritime Customs vessels of the
right of innocent resort to Hong Kong waters was not
practicable, and finally, that the Admiralty agreed
with him that the Commodore's proposal for the
establishment of a naval patrol was not desirable.
Sir John Brennan and one of the Admiralty
representatives then referred to the prospect of a
Japanese force being landed to cut the Kowloon-Canton
Railway. They said in effect that if such a force
were established on the Hong Kong frontier no
defence of the Colony would be possible should the
Japanese have designs upon it. They expressed the
most pessimistic view of the whole outlook, and it
was urged that it should be reviewed immediately by
the Cabinet, as any successful attack on Hong Kong
by