44
152
Sovietised China would be a mortal danger to Japan. Consequently, the funda- mental factor which governed the Japanese army view was that the Sovietisation of the country could not be allowed; and the phrase "maintenance of peace in East Asia meant, more than anything else, the maintenance of such conditions as would ensure that Sovietisation of China could not come about.
5. China was, in the opinion of the army, too large a unit to be successfully governed, at the present stage of development, from one centre.
The army therefore favoured the idea that China should be divided for purposes of control into three main portions: North China, Central China and South-West China. It was not the object of the military to attempt to seize China or to attach any part of it to the Japanese Empire; nor was it the intention to control any part of China in the interests of Japan to the exclusion of the interests of the Chinese themselves. Neither again was it the intention to force this division of China upon a reluctant people. What the Japanese army would like to see would be the setting up of these Governments by the Chinese themselves in their own interests. What Japan wanted was a friendly China, who would co-operate with Japan for the advantage of both countries, and it obviously was to the advantage of both that peace and order should prevail throughout the country, and that any tendency towards bolshevisation should be eradicated.
6. In this scheme of things the position of North China was of vital importance to the Japanese. A glance at the map would confirm this. It was for this reason that the Japanese were anxious to see the early establishment of an autonomous area in the North of China. They did not wish to force this arrangement upon the Chinese, but hoped that the movement would be spon- taneous. The army would help the development of such an area by advice and in any other way in their power; the benefit would be mutual. The Japanese hoped that such an area would be so well governed and so successful that it would be a model on which other parts of China would base their Governments. 7. The army as yet had no clear-cut plans for bringing about this desirable state of things. There were many difficulties to overcome. Chiang Kai-shek could not be trusted. He played off Japan against Great Britain or America. It was even believed that he was in contact with Soviet influences, and the Japanese were much concerned by the fact that Chiang Kai-shek's much-talked-of anti-Red campaign had resulted in a large portion of the Chinese Red armies being driven into the north of Shanshi [Shenshi], an area where the spread of their doctrines would be most harmful to Japanese interests.
8. The Nanking Government had shown signs of wishing to negotiate for a solution of all questions outstanding between China and Japan. The Japanese army did not feel that any good would come of an attempt to settle these questions till they were assured that China really understood the Japanese point of view and were willing frankly to co-operate with her. The Japanese believed that understanding would come in time, because what they desired was sincerely for the benefit of both countries, and not merely for the selfish interests of Japan alone. Time, however, was a most important factor, for it would be far more difficult to clear the country of Bolsheviks and Soviet influence after it has once been established in China, than to prevent it ever gaining a foothold. An entrance had already been effected. This pressing need to hasten the advent of order had resulted in some divergence as to methods by which the Chinese could be gained to the Japanese point of view. Methods were being discussed at the present time both in the army and in the Cabinet.
9. Reverting to my original statement that we were alarmed that China's feeling of despair might bring on hostilities, Major Yamamoto stated that he did not think that there was danger of hostilities between the two countries because, as had already been explained, Japan's greatest interest in China was peace and good government.
10. I asked what was the area which the Japanese army thought should be included in the North China Autonomous State. Major Yamamoto replied that the Japanese had nothing rigidly fixed in their minds, but they considered that the five northern provinces which had already been so often mentioned should be included. I asked also if the Japanese army were satisfied with what had already been accomplished up to date, namely, the establishment of the Chahar-Hopei Autonomous Council, which included under its jurisdiction both Peking and Tientsin. Major Yamamoto laughed, and said: "No, not at all; it [the arrange- ment] has no stability and might vanish at any moment.'
}}
11.
153
drew Major Yamamoto's attention to the fact that he had stressed the Bolshevik danger; but the press had often referred to the economic advantages to Japan arising from an autonomous North China under Japanese guidance and the necessity for gaining control for war purposes of raw materials on the continent The Yomiuri of the 19th January had published what purported to be a War Office statement to this effect. The reply I received was that the control of raw materials and economic co-operation with China have, of course, been in the minds of the Japanese, but these are purely secondary considerations. There are other places from which raw materials can be derived besides North China. For instance, South China, Malaya, and so on. These were minor problems when compared to the Russian menace, which was Japan's primary concern. The army realised that Great Britain was anxious about her economic rights. They were small compared with Japan's necessities. Peace and order in China were Japan's very life, and it was imperative that Japan should safeguard her future. In order to do this, Japan realised that she must come to an agreement with China. How to arrive at a suitable agreement was a point on which there were differences of opinion, and there were some who wished to go faster than others. I mentioned the question of recognition of Manchuria. Major Yamamoto agreed that this was a difficulty which might be got over by a tacit understanding of some kind.
E. A. H. JAMES,
Military Attaché.
Tokyo, February 6, 1936.
45