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to me to be possibly somewhat optimistic, and I cannot help feeling that the Japanese army is inclined to act on the assumption that what it says three times, rather forcibly, must be recognised as true by everybody. There is a certain blindness to the fact that the part which the Japanese army proposes to play is that of a senior partner who is bent on getting all he wants without much consideration for the independence or feelings of the younger member of the partnership.
Major Yamamoto, although stressing the point that Japan wishes to retain the friendship of China, realises that there is a school of thought in the army which wants to press on at a speed which would be dangerous to the good relations with China, which they profess to wish to foster.
My own impression is that it would be difficult at the present time for anyone to moderate the ambitions of the army, and that there is some danger that the army will be inclined to get what it wants by constant threats of force, even if it does not use force itself. The army does, however, recognise that its plans would be more difficult of realisation if the Chinese people learned to hate, as well as distrust, the Japanese people. General Minami, the Commander of the Japanese army in Manchuria, referred to this point in a recent address to Japanese consular authorities in Manchuria; and Major-General Doihara has also referred to the unfortunate effect of the bad relations which exist between the Chinese and inferior Japanese officials in Manchuria.
E. A. H. JAMES,
Military Attaché.
[F 1486/34/10]
No. 58.
Sir R. Clive to Mr. Eden.-(Received March 16.)
(No. 83. Confidential.) Sir,
Tokyo, February 17, 1936.
I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a note by the military attaché covering an interesting memorandum of a conversation which he had with the War Minister's secretary on the subject of Japanese military aims in North China.
I have, &c.
Sir,
Enclosure 1 in No. 58.
Colonel James to Sir R. Clive.
R. H. CLIVE.
Tokyo, February 6, 1936.
I ATTACH a note of a conversation with the War Minister's private secretary on Japanese army views on North China questions.
I think that Major Yamamoto's exposition was perfectly sincere, though he did not specifically mention the strategic advantages to Japan of her control of North China and Inner Mongolia. Perhaps this was rather too delicate a point to stress, and it might be inferred from his references to the necessity of Japan preventing the development of Soviet influence.
Major Yamamoto did recognise that it was perhaps not easy for China to see all at once that what Japan wanted was as much for the benefit of China as for Japan; but he believed that in time this would be recognised. This seems
Enclosure 2 in No. 58.
Note of Conversation with Major Yamamoto, Private Secretary to the Japanese War Minister, February 6, 1936.
I MADE use of the opportunity of a visit to the Ministry of War this morning on other business to ask Major Yamamoto, the War Minister's private secretary, for information on Japanese army views on North China questions.
2. I began the conversation by telling Major Yamamoto that we had heard from various sources that the Chinese authorities seemed to despair of ever being able to satisfy Japanese wishes in North China. No sooner did one problem appear to be solved than another made its appearance, until the Chinese were being driven to think that it would be better to yield nothing further, well knowing the risk of possible hostilities with Japan which such action might entail. If this really was the belief of responsible Chinese, it was obviously a very dangerous one, and I would be grateful if he could explain to me the attitude of the Japanese army to this North China problem. If he himself did not feel in a position to discuss the question fully with me, perhaps he could kindly arrange an interview for me with a senior officer who could give me some information on the subject. 3. Major Yamamoto said that he thought that he could himself explain the army policy in China, and the following is a summary of our conversation.
4. He began by saying that Japan considered it "her mission to maintain peace and order in Eastern Asia." I here interrupted Major Yamamoto and said that I had frequently seen this phrase used, but that I had never exactly understood what was intended by the expression. Major Yamamoto replied that he hoped to make this point clear as he developed his exposition of army policy. He went on to say that for the last twenty-five years China had never had any form of stable government and that, if she were left to herself, there was little likelihood of improvement. Every man who had risen to power had invariably placed his personal and private interests and those of his family before every other consideration. There could be no progress towards stability till rulers governed for the benefit of the ruled and were supported by them. Now it was essential for Japan's future existence that peace and order should be restored in China. Her disintegration into complete chaos would not only be a lamentable thing in itself, but would be a disaster to Japan. This was the case because a chaotic China was bound to become a prey to Soviet influence, and a
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