(5) on 53552/36
(1)
2.
can easily be averted since what Chinese mainly desire is to
get their unreserved claim to jurisdiction recognised and I think they would be ready to enter a gentleman's agreement not to station armed troops in the city and to consult the Hongkong authorities in all matters such as height of buildings, etc.
In case of war military requirements would of course be paramount but we should then have excellent reason under treaty for request- ing that Chinese authority be withdrawn temporarily.
5. Nor am I convinced by the argument contained in paragraph 3 of Hongkong despatch to Colonial Office of November 10th 1936.
The dangers to which Sir Andrew Caldecott hints are I consider
largely illusory so long as the area surrounding the city is controlled by Hongkong and we have an example in Weihaiwei (which was an exact parallel to Kowloon) to prove how peacefully a Chinese city can function within a British territory.
6. I am much disturbed over this case. I feel that it is
essential for us to maintain in our future relation with Chinese the highest tolerances of international probity and I am not at all sure that in this case we have right on our side. Furthermore the danger of agitation with reactions on our commercial relations with South China cannot be ignored.
I am well aware that the views I have put forward will be unpalatable to the Colonial Government. Nonetheless I trust that
they will receive serious consideration. The Chinese attitude is not dictated by pure malice as Hongkong despatch to Colonial Office
sub [? grp. omtd.] (2) of January 6th 1937 implies: indeed if
matter went to The Hague the case might well go against us.
Addressed to Foreign Office No. 127 of April 29th, repeated to Hongkong, Peking.