5
It is nulikely that recent works har eradiculed out of thes Cantonese anthontics all personal interest in the
smuggling activites at HK.. So that opposition on some scale must still be expected in practic. ING.
7A
مل
negotiated in 1930 and dropped at the very last
minute by the Chinese, owing, it is alleged, to
x
financially interested opposition from Canton.
(The annexure to the memorandum tells that story
more fully, if the Secretary of State has time
to read it). We have just learnt that
Sir F. Maze (the Inspector General of the Chinese
Maritime Customs) has unofficially asked if
negotiations on the basis of the 1930 draft might
be resumed and has received a favourable answer
from the Governor. A despatch on the subject
is now on its way from Hong Kong and consideration
of any action should await its arrival.
The Secretary of State also asked about
currency policy in Hong Kong and I attach a
separate note on the recent history of that.
As shown there, that policy was determined in the
closest consultation with the Governor (who kept
in close touch with banking and trade interests
in Hong Kong) and with our "experts" here,
particularly the Treasury and the Bank of England,
the views on the crucial issues expressed on
behalf of the Bank being, we were given to
understand, those of the Governor himself. It is
fairly certain, in the light of after events that
Hong Kong would have benefited by depreciating
its currency parallel with Shanghai throughout,
but it was by no means obvious that that would be
wise when the question originally arose. It is
perhaps not necessary to consider whether any blame
should be apportioned but it may truthfully be
said that those responsible in the Colonial
Office were at all times more disposed to take
action than the advisers whose advice they
actually agreed to take,
sell lose?
on return
EWGent. 5.
12-10
12-10-36