(2)
80
16. On passage to Tsisch Point he expressed his intention to resign his post 3 weeks hence as the work was too hard.
17.
He appeared to cherish every hope of marching to Tai Sami from Tsiech Point, being re-embarked there and conveyed back to Autan before dark the same day with the object of meeting Colonel Chen: The military object gained by this plan of campaign appeared to be somewhat obscure. Indeed his plans generally appeared vague in the extreme.
18.
Another expressed hope was to be in Hong Kong on
3rd February to meet his brother for Chinese New Year celebrations.
19.
At 1230 communication was established with "WU FUNG" and Major Ma directed her to proceed to Tai Sami. She reported "sailing now".
20. At 1310 "DECOY" arrived off the eastern end of the sandy bbaach opposite the road leading inland (Chart 1962, plan of Goat Island) but the surf being obviously too much to permit the safe disembarkation of Chinese soldiers. I proceeded 2.3 miles westward.
21. The party was landed there safely though they displayed no very evident signs of enthusiam.
22. Before landing I acquainted Major Ma with the latest information received from "DEFENDER" who had visited Tai Sami and he informed me that he would not require my services further.
23.
He especially asked me to convey his thanks to the Commodore and espressed deep gratitude for the trouble taken and regrets the trouble imposed by the piracy.
24. At 1502. "DECOY" proceeded southward to the traffic route in anticipation of Commodore's approval.
25. "DEFENDER" who had joined me from Tai Sami was directed to resume patrol and in doing so was instructed to show herself well inside Hei Chi Chin Bay until dark.
26.
This disposition insured the patrol area being adequately guarded until dark.
27.
At 1939 when in position 133 deg:, 9.2 miles from Mirs Point "DEFENDER" passed to "DECOY" a message from S.S. "SEISTAN" reporting a steamer standing in towards Mirs Bay looking suspicious.
28.
At the same time "SEISTAN" was sighted and the above information confirmed by V/3.
29.
Course was immediately altered for Kirs Bay and speed increased to 24 knots. Very shortly after this the visibility became greatly reduced and as no fixes were possible speed had to be reduced to slow until land could be observed, which it was at close range.
Asdics were beneficial as a check in feeling my way in.
30. Ship established W/T communication with Police Launch No.4 and anchored in Peng Chau Roads at 2010 having observed no ships on passage.
31. In the mist the searchlights proved ineffective for searching the Ha Sha beaches: this was accordingly carried by an armed motor boat but nothing suspicious was to be found.
Page 80Page 81