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and the Treasury Chest Officer direct either
(a) Hong Kong could have got the sterling remittice
at the price she actually paid and the Treasury Chest
Officer would have got his dollars for £150 less
or (b) they could have 'split' the difference and each
have saved £75.
This case, however, seems quite contrary
to the arguments in the Colonial Treasurer's minute
generally - in fact he immediately proceeds to
disprove the case by reference to the quoted rates.
We have no evidence to show whether the Treasury
Chest Officer gets any specially favourable rates
or merely the 'paper' rates. Generally, the
argument is that the Colonial Treasurer, not being
bound to remit at any particular date waits for a
specially favourable time and then gets, due
apparently to his happy relations with the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank, a high sterling rate, still
more favourable than the 'paper' rate. On the
other hand a favourable rate for the Treasury
Chest Officer is the converse of a favourable
rate for Hong Kong, as naturally the Treasury Chest
Officer wants to buy dollars at the lowest rate
possible. While the natural desires of both
parties are therefore diametrically opposed, it
is conceivable (as in the case quoted) that on
occasion a direct arrangement would be to their
mutual advantage, but apparently such a condition
would be quite rare. Taking the 'paper' rates
(which show a difference between the buying and
selling rates for sterling) as a normal condition
it is obvious that any splitting of the difference
between