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"impressed by arguments proceeding upon a comparison between
"the facts of one case and the facts of another. Frecedents
"are valuable and authoritative when they lay down a principle.
"They are otherwise merely illustrations of the way in which
"judges look at facts.....Different judges look at facts
"differently".
In the same report is to be found also a
comment of Lord Finlay (quoted from "Craig v. Glasgow
Corporation" 1919 8.C. (H.L.) 1). *Wo inquiry is more idle
than one which is devoted to seeing how nearly the facts of
cases come together. The use of cases is for the propo~
sition of la they contain".
The remark already cited from
Stephen's "Digest of the Law of Evidence" may be true but it
casts no reflecti a on judges.
Zach cʻse has its own
features.
Certain cases stand out as clear examples.
*Reg. v. Rhodes" (1899) 1 .B.,77, the Frisoner was
indicted for obtaining eggs by a false pretence.
In
The
false pretence was contained in a newspaper advertisement,
from which other frauds followed. Avåde noe of those
other frauds was admitted not as relevant to any particular
issue in the case but as forming part of one fraudulent
transaction, namely a bogus business. On the other hand,
in "R. v. Ellis" (1910) 2 K.B. 746, the charge was for
defrauding A by false tences in connection with a sale
erence was made in cross-examination by
which it was alleged the accused had fraudulently obtained
money on other occasions, but also from A and also on a
sale of porcelain. It was held that the question was asked
in breach of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, s. 1 s...(1).
of percelain.
In other words, it was held that this was a series of separate fraudulent transactions and not one fraudulent
business. "There was no systematic course of swindling
(sẹc
by the same methods" (Bray J. at p. 761) (see also "R, v,
Fisher "1910, 1 K.B., 149).