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dealing with the one point in the case. He has confined
himself to the aw on one branch of the subject. He has
failed to deal with three points:
1. That this is a procurement case makes all the
difference.
2. That the Chui and Zimmem and Christie incidents were
distinct transactions, and do not satisfy the test of
3.
Kennedy, J., in R. v. Bond.
If they are separate transactions how is the
Zimmern and Christie evidence admiɛa ble. If they
are the one transaction, the Zimmern and Christie
evidence goes in.
I challenge Sheldon's proposition that evidence of a
distinct crime can be given if the object is to murder the
sanep ex
neperson, or to defraud him. I have referred to three
cases where the person was the same.
The oɛzes
negativing the defence of accident are irrelevant.
R. v. Harrie is in my favour. The principle of the
Case falls within what Kennedy, J., says in . v. Bond.
(Sheldon did not deal with . v. Harris.)
3. v. Cookɛ is referred to only in a few line of
extract from a text book, and cannot be any gui anee.
Sheldon said that there was evidence of meant,
opportunity, and preparation, e.g., the offer of $10,000
and the pro curing of poison and syringes but to what issue
is that relevant.
6. v. Lovegrove is an instance of Halsbury's first
class, acts probative of the main fact. The evidence
was relevant to an issue. It was admitted because of the
issue raised by the defence.
R. v. Lovegrove is referred to in R. v. Armstrong (1922)
2 K.B. 263.