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Harris v. S.S. Franconia, 1877 2 C.P.D. 173, and the
Fagernes, 1927 P 311).
Thus, in our opinion, Section 2 of the Piracy
Act 1837 does not assist, except in so far as it affects
the question of punishment.
G
We think that the object of this Act was not the
definition of the crime of piracy but the regulation of
its punishment. It must be remembered that at this time
statutory revisions of punishments, and more particularly
capital punishment, was occupying the attention of the
legislature see for instance the Criminal Law Act 1827,
Section 7, the Forgery Act 1837, and the Punishment of
Offences Act, 1837. We think the object of the Piracy
Act 1837 was to retain the death penalty in cases of piracy
with violence, but in other cases of statutory or municipal
piracy to substitute transportation for death (Section 3).
Moreover, if actual robbery is an essential ingredient
in piracy the Section carries the matter no further: if it
is not, it is unnecessary to invoke the Section.
Accordingly, in our opinion, it would not have
been correct to indict these twelve prisoners under the
Piracy Act 1837, Section 2, or any other provision of
English municipal law relating to piracy.
On the other hand, we do not agree with what we
understand to be the view of the Hong Kong Court that they
were not competent to try a charge of piracy "jure gentium"
We entertain no doubt that the Hong Kong Court possesses
jurisdiction over foreigners accused of piracy jure
gentium'. We think such jurisdiction was inherent under
international law, upon the doctrine that the pirate is
'hostis humani generis' and his crimes are justiciable
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anywhere/