in Hong Kong were probably promoted independently by the
C.P.G. there, in an opportunist desire to make the most
of genuine labour unrest
(b) Mainland China had to react to the situation, and
chose to give support to the C.P.G. in Hong Kong.
3. The unknown factor in the present crisis is how
far mainland China has now decided to go in bringing
pressure on IMG, and how far there are different views
there on future policy.
4. The possible interpretations of the Chinese course
on the assumption
of action, that she is now controlling events, appear
to be these:-
L
(i) China has decided to try to force us to
If
accept a Macao position in Hong Kong,
this is so, she will continue to escalate
Hong Kong disturbances to the point when,
in order to remain in Hong Kong, we must
capitulate to whatever demands are made, and,
in effect, accept Chinese domination of Hong Kong.
(11) China has decided to sacrifice the economic
benefits she derives from Hong Kong to Cultural
Revolution "purity" of doctrine, and to drive us out
qf Hong Kong completely,
(iii)
China has made no basic policy decision, but is
trying to achieve some propaganda victory as the
price for calling-off the disturbances. Such
a propaganda gain could relate to the presence
of American ships and troops from Vietnam on
leave in Hong Kong; or to labour reforms;
to the release from prosecution or
of the
21
or
imprisonment
charged with or sentenced
5.
6.
for their role in the riots,
Our aim must continue to be that of restoring order
and peace in Hong Kong. We have so far acted with both firmness and
restraint. But the police are now tired, and
it is clear that if disturbances continue we shall have to use troops.
This in itself may provoke Chinese escalation, both both in Hong Kong
itself and in mainland China.
We must
therefore consider HMG's interests very carefully indeed.
Qu
A
I convinced that a Macao solution would be unacceptable. It would be
damaging to our international prestige (at a
we face a hamber of problems).
Crucis
4
very
time when Gibraltar and Adep are presenting-several problems) It would
be intolerable for, the Governor, and impossible in
/terms
H
ידיד rחt-
7.
B
terms
A
affan's of my responsibility for Hong Kong in Parliament, This being so,
it follows that if China is embarking upon course (i), our resistance to
it will
compel her to resort to (ii) or (iii). If she has decided, or later
decides upon (ii), an alternatives
would be to resist which could would mean war
to withdraw.
or
Withdrawal would represent an unpleasant recognition
of the realities of the situation. I am very much
concerned that if this proves inevitable, our decision to withdraw
should be so made and so implemented as to
preserve as much of our dignity as is possible. To
scuttle out hastily under intensive Chinese pressure
would be intolerable.
I therefore propose to inform.
my colleagues if my information should lead me to the belief that
withdrawal is likely to be inevitable, and I am in the meantime
preparing contingency plans
for withdrawal, in consultation with the Secretary of
State for Defence.
9. If, however, we are facer win
Course (li), I must ask my
to consider one o
Colleague to
more the following possibilities Open to us.
(a) We could proceed vicposonsty
and effectively to carry one lasoin reformis.. I have been engaged in
dócussion with the Hong Kong Government Krough The Goreiner, aboni.
Theme
in any
But there
case;
has been á considerable Amount of resistance pour The "employers
represent alwes on the Executive Counci
In early Mary (?) I insisted.
on land
аска
on
eary achai particular aspect. The
one
employers are at present very anxious asamitié qemeral Situation
commimediarely
and we
Comedy Cams Inrough extensive.
Cany And long-overdue labomi reforms (outlined in Annex B), I woved like
to do this; But the taboon reform
is labour
Aptar, earth It woner be welcome! by the average Worker in Hong Kong and
woned give us
à bener
A
moral position but it woner be unlikely to satisty, China:
·Nevertheless of the Chinese decision were to Mayap. Mas seek a lowering
of the temperature, she might.
&
well clami a
4 we do
viday. In shove
what is certainty
right we may gave que China a face-Saving Pormnia at the cost of her
claim to a propaganda gain
(by we comes withdraw
Consent
in
to American leave
visits to HK in the
1
Knowledge that her troops.
Corned wake
стече
use kai
they do ar present of Bangkok. And Manila. As The effect of this would
be gradual. as it became realised thei no further visits were taking
place. (At the moment, we
have cancelled Thure (?) inipending nails) which wit abonent take place)
Qui in die
the Chinese toned.
Com se
слалий
a significans
propaganda gani
ANRA because of thei Concern with Russian attitudes, the's woned
winous donor be meaningful to them manner.
We comer make concessions in relation to changes, and sentences already
passes upon those who participared in the nits. The Chinese.
прог
that we
pumili
conneme
Annart
shoven
ou
are the
them
aporigin
to the "vistime
は
Chemi
сотр
an
110.
"
"demands" included Thi's wome's now bein
accord win the legal and Come procedures in HK
and I
it.
مه
не
not recommend
I therefore ask my colleagues to endorse the general. Conclusions
reached in
6,7 and
sara!! 8 and to decide:
Whelner
showed to
Mamão pursue either (a) or (b) above
а вый
ין
146
1.
SECRET
HONG KONG
Outline of Paper for OPD
We have always known that Hong Kong was vulnerable.
But it is valuable to China and we had assumed that it was
Indeed there
in her interests to maintain the status quo. has been evidence in the
past that the Central Government
have controlled and restrained the Communists in the territory.
2.
The scene has now changed. Arising out of labour troubles
a major campaign has been amounted in Hong Kong itself linked with
hostile demonstrations in Shanghai and Peking and with
the expulsion of our representative in Shanghai. A loosening of
control by mainland China of the Communists in Hong Kong has
resulted from recent developments in the Cultural Revolution. The first
mass demonstrations in Hong Kong were probably promoted
independently by the Communists there, in an opportunist desire
to make the most of genuine labour unrest. Mainland China had
to react to the situation, and chose to give support to the C.P.G.j
in Hong Kong.
3. The unknown factor in the present crisis is how far mainland
China has now decided to go in bringing pressure on HMG, and
how far there are different views there on future policy.
4. The possible interpretations of the Chinese course of action,
assuming
that she is now controlling events, appear to be these:
change
(i) China has made no basic policy decision, but is trying
to achieve some propaganda victory as the price for
calling-off the disturbances. Such a propaganda gain could relate to the
presence of American ships and troops from
Vietnam on leave in Hong Kong; or to labour reforms;
to the release from prosecution or imprisonment of the
persons charged with or sentenced for their role in the
riots.
or
PAGO
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/ (ii)
よ
SECRET
5.
(ii)
China has decided to try to force us to accept
a Macao position in Hong Kong. If this is so, she will continue to
escalate Hong Kong disturbances to the point when, in order to remain in
Hong Kong, we must capitulate to whatever demands are made, and, in
effect,
accept Chinese domination of Hong Kong.
(iii) China has decided to sacrifice the economic
benefits she derives from Hong Kong to Cultural
Revolution "purity" of doctrine, and to drive us out
of Hong Kong completely.
We cannot resist a determined attempt to force us out
altogether and we could not tolerate the humiliation of
remaining in Hong Kong without effective control. But there
is no need to assume the worst and our immediate responsibility
is to maintain law and order, retain morale and confidence so
that the economy can continue to flourish. Firm action is
required to do this but, at the same time we should avoid,
as far as possible, action which could be regarded by the
C.P.G. as provocative. We should avoid doing anything to
"escalate the confrontation" to the extent that we get
involved in a situation from which there is no escape except by abject
surrender or a futile attempt to fight it out,
leading to the same result, Our steps, therefore, must be
directed to the needs of the local security situation while
taking the wider implications into account, and they need
to be carefully measured and timed.
SECRET
16.
SECRET
6. Recommendations
(i) Local Security
(a) We are already sending the Commando Carrier
BULWARK to Hong Kong where she should arrive by
the end of this week.
(b) The governor has already been authorised to
neutralise several of the buildings from which
the campaign is being directed,
(c) The Governor has now asked for authority to pick
up and, if possible, deport (or failing that,
detain) a selection of up to 24 known leaders of
the present campaign. The disruption of the
leadership would be a distinct and positive gain
and would be seen by the majority of the population
as firm action. On the other hand it is unlikely that
the Chinese Government would accept these leaders as
deportees and, if they were detained in Hong Kong,
this would provide Peking and the local Communists
with a grievance. The Governor has undertaken not
to use this weapon lightly or unnecessarily and, on
balance, I recommend that he should be given the
authority to go ahead if the situation requires it.
(d) Action against the principal Communist newspaper
which is the official C.P.G. organ in Hong Kong.
The Governor accepts that prosecutions for sedition
or inciting the police to disaffection might have
duotina dangerous
repercussions, and is proposing to seek
emergency powers to close down the printing press,
h but/would only take action after consulting me on
each individual case. I would propose to give him
a general authority on this understanding.
/(ii)
SECRET
|
1
(ii) Labour
Relations between employees and employers in Hong Kong have not been
good and we should do our
best to improve matters.
Less than 12% of the total working force are declared members of
trade unions
and there are 100,000 members of the Communist
Unions as opposed to 70,000 others.
The Communist
Unions are basically disinterested in genuine industrial issues. I
recommend that we should press the Governor to go ahead vigorously with
improvements
in the labour legislation including early steps to
shorten the hours of work of women and young persons.
(iii) Other Matters
(a) Facilities to the U.S.
In the background of our difficulties with
the C.P.G. lies their irritation at the
facilities which the U.S. forces in Vietnam
enjoy in Hong Kong. We have latterly restricted
number visits of warships to the same as last year and
more recently have suggested that larger ships
should not come. I do not recommend any further !
immediate action since any significant
diminution would be claimed by the Chinese as
a propaganda victory. But I am sure that this
is something that we should keep under review
in the longer term.
(b) Military Planning
I suggest that contingency planning should
be set in hand with regard to the implications
of:-
(i) a prolonged confrontation with Communist
China;
ii) withdrawal7.
SECRET
St.S.
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
97499
C
Registry No.
Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.
DRAFT
O.P.D. PAPER
Type 1 +
To:-
From
Telephone No. & EIL
Department
Memorandum by the Commonwealth Secretary
Situation in Hong Kong
A background note on the recent
disturbances ie at annex.
2.
The policy of the Hong Kong Government
has been to deal firmly with any disorders
which the Communists may try to instigate
but at the same time to avoid so. far as
possible action which could be regarded by
the Chinese Peoples Government as
unnecessarily provocative.
3. One encouraging feature is that many
public organisations have rallied behind
the Government's attempts to maintain peace. in
Hong Kong. But there are already signe
that unless the Hong Kong Government are seen
to take effective action to. control the
situation, instead of simply acting to block
individual Communist initiatives, public
confidence will slip. Once this occurs a
landslide could quickly follow.
4. The key to the situation is the
maintenance of public confidence and especiall
police morale, The police have stood up to
the situation very well but:-
(a) fatigue is now beginning to tell on
them; and
(b) the constant barrage of Communist
propaganda
gand
5.
propaganda, directed specifically to
the submission and intimidation of the
rank and file, could begin to take
effect if allowed to continue unchecked.
The Governor has been given authority
to neutralize several of the buildings from
which the campaign is being directed by
declaring 24 hour curfews in the areas round
the building, or by declaring closed areas
around them. This will, initially, disrupt their
communications and seriously hamper their
control of operations. If they move to other
premises it would be easier for the Hong
Kong Government to keep them under closer
surveillance,
6.
The Commando Carrier "Bulwark" has been
ordered to Hong Kong and should arrive on the
May. Her presence will strengthen public
and police morale.
7.
The Governor has also recommended
(1) picking up and if possible deporting
(and failing that detaining) a
selection (e.g. up to 24) of the known
leaders of the present campaign;
and
(ii) action against the principal Communist
newspaper "Wen Wel Po", the official
C.P.G. organ in Hong Kong, for either sedition or inciting the police to
disaffection.
8.
The disruption of the leadership would
be a distinct and positive gain, at least in
the
NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN
SECRET
the short term. It would be seen by the majority of
On the other hand the population as firm
action.
it is unlikely that the Chinese Government would accept
these leaders as deportees and they would have to be
detained in Hong Kong. This would provide Peking
and the local Communists with a standing grievance and
a further "demand".
9.
The newspaper "Wen Kei Po" is in flagrant breach
of the law and if its activities continue to be
ignored it may well be taken as a sign of weakness.
There are nine other Communist newspapers in Hong
Kong which could continue the campaign unless
similar action were taken against them. Action
against these newspapers would certainly be regarded
by Peking as provocation.
10. Labour Relati ons. The Communist dominated
trade unions are basically disinterested in genuine
industrial issues, except in so far as they can
exploit them for political ends.
Indeed, their
demand is not for more Government involvment in
labour relations but precisely the contrary the
-
Government should stay out of labour disputes and
leave them to be settled by direct "struggle"
between management and labour on cultural revolutionary
lines. Less than 12% of the total working force
of about 1.5m. are declared members of trade unions
(100,000 favouring the Communist F.T.U., 40,000 the
right-wing T.U.C. and 30,000 neutrals) and paid-up
membership are smaller (9% of the labour force).
11.
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SECRET
:
11.
Hours of work for women and young children.
There is a split between the employers and workers'
representatives on this issue, but the recent events
are likely to have put the employers in a more
receptive frame £ of mind. The Governor has
suggested that a possible method of reducing the hours
of work would be by legislation to empoĝer the
Commissioner of Labour (by regulation):-
(i) to introduce at once a 48 hour week for
individual industries where this is not
already the universal practice;
(ii) to introduce at once in industries where the
48 hour week is the common but not the
universal practice, a 48 hour week with
permissive overtime, about 12 hours per week
for individual factories;
(iii) to work out a phased programme for the
12.
reduction of the standard working week for all
other industries, with the object of bringing
them all ultimately to 48 hours.
The Governor also considers that now is the
moment to announce that the Hong Kong Government, with
the advice and assistance of H.M.G., intends to proceed
with a review and Expanнtix expansion of its labour
legislation, on which considerable preliminary work has already been
done (there are about 30 pieces of legislation at various xxx stages of
preparation).
He would welcome expert assistance from H.M.G. in
carrying out this review and considers that an expert
SECRET
would
SECRET
1.
would need to be lent to the Hong Kong Government
for a period of between 6-12 months. He has asked
for the services of Miss S.A. Ogilvie (Assistant
Labour Adviser, Ministry of Overseas Development)
for this purpose.
13.
Available information suggests that the
disturbances of 6 May and later were not instigated
from China but occurred partly because control over
pro-Communist organisations in Hong Kong fron
The
China had slackened and local leaders had taken the
initiative in acting in a militant fashion which
they believed to be in keeping with the present
atmosphere within China. Since the tk 15 May, however,
Peking has supported the Hong Kong pro-Communist Chinese "demands" and
after large scale demonstrations
in Peking and the xak sacking of the office in
Shanghai have closed down the Shanghai Office.
Russians (Moscow telegram 848 of 20 May) have also
begun to taunt Peking about the Chinese lack of
interest in undermining the colonial regime in Hong
Kong, trade with which yielded more than half China's
foreign currency earnings. The Chinese may
themselves also hope that by putting pressure on Hong
Kong they can prevent it being used by American
warships and leave personnel.
14. The dilemma we face is that determined and firm
action against the pro-Communist leaders and newspapers
in Hong Kong is essential if we are to retain control
over
SECRET
SECRET
over the situation in Hong Kong. But such action