Mr. Denson
Mr. Foggon
Mr
D. Hawkins
Commonwealth office (News
Dept.)-Mr. Carrocher
Export Credits Guarantee Dept.- Mr. C.P. Rawlings
F.0./0.0.
Board of Trade
Ministry of Defence( Room 7365)-Mr. Henn
IT
++
+1
10
Consular Sept.
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
*E
7163)-Major Koe 5131) M.0.2.
SECRET
Cypher
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 24 May 1967
R. 24
12302
COON SE
אבלנןגבס וא
136)
1967
MAY
7 1
PAR
FLASH SECRET No.690
192
adopted.
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D.)
Repeated
!!
11
"Peking No.262
"POLAD Singapore No.127 "Washington No.1 38
(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)
132
My telegram No.680 (not repeated).
Following (?for Garner) from Galsworthy.
Following is a summary of the measures already
Maintenance of Public Confidence
2. Support of the Government's actions has been remarkably strong and
widespread. Its open expression has been officially encouraged by all
possible means and has been widely
H.M.G.'s
publicised through the press, radio and television.
clear support has been of very great assistance in maintaining the
momentum of this confidence. As this has been reiterated and as each new
step taken here to maintain order is announced there has been a further
surge in confidence.
This has proved
a disconcerting weapon for the Communists and we cannot afford to let it
be blunted.
3. The Information Services Department has issued large quantities of
useful counter-propaganda material against the excesses in the Communist
press and this has been made full use of by the radio and the friendly
press. This is biving on the Communist press which is devoting
increasing space in attempts to defeat it.
4. The Department has also had marked success in promptly countering all
malicious rumours (e.g. of rice or water shortages, or bank runs) put
about by the Communists.
5. The Labour Department's achievement in obtaining a settlement of the
dispute in the two artificial flower factories (one of which has already
reopened) has had a good effect on confidence. It will continue to
conciliate wherever possible but stoppages of work in present
circumstances tend to be political not industrial and in at least one
case a conciliation officer was driven out by threats of physical
violence.
6. The arrival shortly of H.M.S. BULWARK is likely to have a very good
effect on confidence generally. Primarily, however, confidence depends
on the ability of the police to maintain order.
/Maintenance
SECRET
SECRET
Maintenance of Public Order
The
70 The Police Force went over to its emergency organisation after the
second violent incident at the artificial flower factory at San Po Kong
on 11 May. auxiliary police (some 2,400 volunteers) were called out on
the same day. The turnout was 99.5%. The Government Emergency
Control Centre also opened on 11 May.
8. Very great restraint has been exercised throughout. Processions,
assemblies in public places and the sticking of posters on public
buildings, although unauthorised and therefore unlawful, were tolerated
so long as demonstrators remained reasonable despite extreme provocation
of the Police by way of shouted abuse, assault and incitement to
disaffection. It has, however, been necessary because of increasing
rowdiness to prohibit and disperse further unlawful assemblies and
processions since 20 May, although until 22 May parties of 20 were still
permitted to present petitions personally at Government House.
9. Where violence (stone throwing at the Police, hooliganism, and damage
to property etc.) has occurred minimum force (626 rounds of tear gas,
batons and 329 baton shells) has been successfully used to stop it. No
firearms have been used (except 3 revolver shots wounding one man by a
constable over whom petrol was thrown). It has not been necessary to
call upon any military forces to help maintain order.
10. Generally speaking, disturbances have occurred principally in
North-east and West Kowloon, in the areas of Government House, the
Central District of Victoria, and the Magistrate's Courts. The Emergency
Court's Regulations made on 23 May empower Courts to exclude the public
other than bona fide press representatives. This has been necessary
because chanting and screaming mobs within and around Courts had made
hearings impossible.
11. The Emergency (Prevention of Inflammatory Speeches) Regulations have
been made today to enable the Police to deal quickly and effectively
with the public address systems which have for some time been operating
from private buildings and blaring forth inflammatory and provocative
Communist propaganda and incitement to violence and disaffection.
Inability to take effective action under the existing law has had a bad
effect on public morale.
12. Disruption of public life by official action has been restricted to
curfews, the temporary diversion of traffic in areas of disturbances and
the temporary closure of some schools. A night curfew was imposed in
parts of Kowloon on the nights of 11, 12, 13, and 18 May and in the
Northern part of Hong Kong Island on 22 May.
13. Total arrests to date have been 788, of whom 42 were released or
acquitted. Of the remainder 439 have been
convicted and 307 cases are pending or unconcluded. Known casualties
have been: Police 36, demonstrators 70. Of these two Police and 14
others were admitted to hospital. Only death has been the bystander
killed by a stone.
SECRET
/Other Measures
F
SECRET
Other Measures
14.
It has not been necessary to call out any units of the (Volunteer)
Essential Services Corps to maintain essential services. Apart from some
stoppages and reduction in land transport services, all public utilities
have continued to function normally.
There has been no interruption in food or water supplies
from China; rice stocks are at present good. Food prices have remained
generally steady.
15. The Auxiliary Air Force has been called out since 11 May so as to
provide "spotter" assistance for the police with its helicopters.
16. Every effort has been made to maintain contact through
intermediaries with individual Communists of influence. While at present
little can be achieved through these channels it is clearly important to
keep them open.
(Passed as requested and advance copy
for Sir Saville Garner)
Distribution
-
-
H.K. W.I.D. 'C'
I.G.D.
J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:
P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
11
[1
1+
11
D.I.O., J.I.R.
- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers
Mr. de la Mare
-
Mr. Bolland
-
Mr. Wilson
IT
Treasury
==
Mr. Dens on
- Mr. Foggon
Jad
Export Credits Guarantee
Department
Ministry of Defence
"
Er
It
Board of Trade
-
Mr. D. Hawkins
Mr. C.P. Rawlings (Room 7365) - Mr. Henn
(Room 7163)- Major Koe (Room 5131)
-
M.0.2
- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
SECRET
Cypher
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
CC:
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 24 May 1967 R. 24
It
"
1 31 02
137)
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 62 25:
HWAY/N
751
MAY
# 12
1907
7.
2:10
FLASH SECRET No.691
130
155
action.
I.
Addressed to Commonwealth Office (D.T.D. Repeated PRIORITY to: Peking
No.263
POLAD Singapore No.128 Washington No.1 39
(S. of S. please pass to all)
My telegram No.680 (not repeated). (133
Following from Galsworthy.
६.
Following is summary of our views on possible future
International Aspects
1. Any deterioration in our relations with Peking runs the risk of
adversely affecting the situation over Hong Kong. We therefore again
strongly advise no action be taken against N.C.N.A. in London (Hong Kong
telegram No.682).
2. Providing we hold on successfully in Hong Kong and the Communist
campaign slackens, it may well eventually become necessary to offer
Peking some way out which they at least can claim saves their face as a
means of terminating the whole incident. This, however, we should only
do from a position of strength. The enormous difficulty is to find
anything suitable to offer as a face-saving gesture and then to find a
means of "offering" it, without giving Peking the idea that we are
weakening. This would lead to further demands, which we would find it
increasingly difficult to resist as did the Portuguese in Macao.
3. The Governor is considering whether there is anything local which
could be used in this way. Another possible course is as follows. It
would in any case be helpful if we could work out with the Americans a
reduction of their use of Hong Kong for the rest and recreation of their
armed forces. As regards naval visits, could these for example be
restricted as a general rule to small units, with only occasional and
well-spaced visits by major units? If we could establish such a
position, while there could clearly be no question whatsoever of our
"negotiating" over this with Peking, it might nonetheless be possible
for them to claim it as a success. We would not of course admit this. We
ro.ise the difficulties, but feel it is worth considering.
II.
Internal Aspects
4. The maintenance of law and order here, which is obviously the first
essential, seems to us to require that the Governor should be authorised
to deport (and failing that detain) selected Communist leaders, if the
situation deteriorates to the point of demanding it (see his telegram
No.677).
SECRET
121
15.
114
SECRET
5. Although the Governor is reluctant to take measures against the Press
(see paragraph 4 of his telegram No.677),(2) Emergency Regulations have
been approved by Executive Council but not yet made, providing powers
for dealing with inflammatory posters in public places and for the
temporary closing down if necessary of printing presses. We agree tha if
a stage is reached at which action against the Communist press has to be
considered, this would be a much swifter and more effective method of
action than prosecuting them through the Courts. If there were a
substantial deterioration in the present situation, we might well have
to contemplate action on these lines.
6.
The Governor has already been authorised to close selected places if
necessary, by means of closed area orders as proposed in his telegram
No.662 paragraph 3.
This power has not yet been used in view of the present lull.
7. The presence of U.K. military forces in Hong Kong is one of the basic
factors in maintaining public morale, and very directly also the morale
of the Police. It would have a most adverse effect here if it became
known that we intended to withdraw a major unit. We feel therefore that
this decision should be shelved for the time being.
8. Apart from the suggestion in paragraph 7, probably the most helpful
contribution we can make from London at the present moment is to repeat
H.M.G.'s support for the Hong Kong Government in their measures to
maintain law and order; and to do this in a way which will convince
people here that we intend to stay in Hong Kong.
(Passed as requested and advance copies to
Sir Saville Garner, Mr. Wilson and
Distribution
-
Mr. de la Mare).
H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.
J.I.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:
P.S. to Prime Minister
'Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
帏
字
tr
it
11
tt
Treasury
D.I.O., J.I.R. P.S. to Mr. Rodgers Mr. de la Mare
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wils on
Mr. Denson
-
Mr. Foggon
Export Credits Guarantee
Department
Board of Trade Ministry of Defence
11
**
18
t
Mr. D. Hawkins
- Mr. C.P. Rawlings
Mr. J.A.B. Darlington (Room 7365) Mr. Henn
Room 7463) Major Koe (Roon 51 31) - M.0.2
-
SECRET
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE CO) KONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
138,
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.63
25twat vol
なんとり
25
Cypher
D. 24 May 1967
R. 24
13352
2
1
IMMEDIATE SECRET No.693
COPY FOR RESISTRATION
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
"Peking No.264
"POLAD Singapore No.129 "Washington No.140
(S. of S. please pass PRIORITY to all)
Repeated
"
EXOT
124
157
DADO
My telegram No.678.124,
Sitrep as at 24 2000 hours.
The day has again been one of uneasy calm. The
emphasis has been on industrial action, mainly in the transport
services, with intimidation playing a substantial part. The threat of
effective counter measures has quietened all pro- Communist broadcasting
over loud-speakers except from the Bunk of China which was again
effectively jammed.
2.
There has been a mainly effective attempt to paralyse public
transport on Hong Kong Island. The Tramway Company has continued to
operate at 50% efficiency. Only a very few buses of the Dhina Kotor Bus
Company were in operation. In both cases there were reports of
successful intimidation. The pro-Communist faction in the Kowloon Motor
Bus Company succeeded in keeping all buses off the road until 0900;
thereafter services were normal. We do not know what the situation will
be tomorrow.
3.
Other developments on the labour front have been a two-hour token strike
by workers in the Hong Kong and Whampao Dock Co. Ltd. and continued
Communist intransigence in the Government workshops where repairs on
Police vehicles have virtually ceased. Right-wing and neutral workers
have taken leave. Action to deal with this is under consideration.
4. There are rumours that the Communists are putting pressure on their
supporters, sympathisers and those over whom they have some form of
economic control such as small shopkeepers selling mainland goods, to
raise money and support for a major effort in the near future. We can
foresee continued harassment through industrial action such as we have
encountered this week, always with the possibility of a larger scale
series of strikes. Nevertheless we still do nut believe that the
Communists will risk alienating the whole population by a general strike
or one in any of the major services such as electricity, telephones of
water.
(Passed as requested with advance copies for
Foreign Office F.E. Dept.)
SECRET
Distribution
SECRET
Distribution
-
K
H.K. W.I.D. 'C' I.G.D.
J.1.C. EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION
DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION
Copies also sent to:
P.S. to Prime Minister Cabinet Office
Foreign Office
- D.I.O., J.I.R.
- P.S. to Mr. Rodgers - Mr. de la Mare
H
It
11
11
-
1+
!
th
Treasury
Mr. Bolland
Mr. Wilson
Mr. Denson - Mr. Foggon
Mr. D. Hawkins
Export Credits Guarantee Department Ministry of Defence (Room 7365)
11
It
11
(Room 7163) Room 5131)
Foreign Office /Commonwealth Office
Board of Trade
-
Mr. C.P. Rawlings Mr. Henn
Major Koe
M.0.2
Consular Dept.
- Mr. J.A.B. Darlington
SECRET
PHER/CAT A
FLASH
PEKING
TELECRAM NO. 570
はxerox
F
TO FOREIGN OFFICE
24 MAY 1967
FOARIX
139
PS
"""Pus⋅ Roa
Mr homers Sir D Willen
Mr.delo slave..... Hal. F.E. Snor (
Ha. S.E.AD
Co.
P.S. Pus⋅
LAST
RIF
CONFIDENTIAL
FLASH.
DID
HK
Depot·L
Q
YOUR TELEGRAM NO 398 : MEASURES AGAINST CHINESE,
Restlyth
Dopic
(bults
IF YOU EXPEL ACTING CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AND OTHER MEMBERS OF CHINESE
CAFF THE CHINESE WILD OF COURSE DE BOUND TO RETALIATE. APART FROH
NSELF THEY ARE LIKELY TO CONCENTRATE ON CHINESE SPEAKERS. THE
RESULT WOULD OF COURSE DI TO REDUCE DRASTICALLY THE EFFECTIVENESS
CF THIS MISSION AT A PARTICULARLY VITAL POINT IN CHINESE HISTORY AND
ASO WITH REGARD TO HONG KONG IN ANGLO-CHINESE RELATIONS. IS THIS
KHAT WE WANT?
NEED
2, I REALISE THE NEED TO MAKE SO..E RETALIATORY GESTURE, DUT I MUST WTH
RESPECT POINT OUT THAT IN THE GAME OF DIPLOMATIC WARFARE THE CILLESE CAN
TRUMP OUR EVERY CARD. THEY CONTROL EVERYTHING HERE, AND
THEY PROBABLY DO HOT BUCH CARE O RESTRICTED THEIR STAFF ARE ABROAD. I
THEREFORE FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO THICK OF ANY EFFECTIVE ETALIATORY
MEASURE WHICH WOULD NOT REBOUND MORE HARDLY ON CURSELVES AND REDUCE THE
EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF THIS MISSION.
3. AS SEEN FROM HERE THE MOST EFFECTIVE STEP AND THE LEAST DAYAG- ING TO
OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE ACTION AGAINST NCNA, I WOULD
PREFER GRADUATED ACTION AS PROPOSED IN MY TELCORAM NO 560 BUT IF YOU
FEEL IT IS ESSENTIAL TO DO SOMETHING MORE DRASTIC I WOULD DE
F
1.ED TO RICK THE CONQUENCES OF COMPLETE CLOSURE, THE DIS-
TARNICE OF REUTERS HERE WOULD DE HO GREAT LOSS TO US (:0
•
STION ON T.
BRESPONDENT IS
RED). IT IS POSSIBLE
T.
¡PPEARANCE OF REUTERS HERE WOULD BE NO GREAT LOSS TO Us (1:0
FLECTION OF THEIR CORRESPONDENT IS INTENDED), IT IS POSSIBLE MOUGH NOT I
THINK CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD RETALIATE AGAINST THIS
OFICE. IN ANY CASE YOU HAVE A FINE QUOTE CASUS BELLI UNQUOTE WITH THIS
MORNING'S NCN A REPORT ON HONG KONG (Y TELEGRAM NO 563).
4. NEVERTHELESS I THINK WẸ RUST TRY TO CEE THIS PROBLEM IN PER-
SPECTIVE. THE AFFRONT TO THE DIGNITY OF MEMBERS OF MY STAFF HAS DEEN
GRAVE, AS IS THE UNILATERAL BREAK OF AN AGREEMENT, BUT THE ACTUAL LOSS
OF SHANGHAI IS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF LITTLE KIPORTANCE TO US. THE
MAIN INTEREST OF H M G IN THIS QUESTION AS CIEN FROM HERE IS TO MAINTAIN
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS MISSION IN CHINA. TO JEOPARDISE THIS IN ORDER
TO MAKE A DEMONSTRATIVE GESTURE CF RETALIATION WOULD I AM SURE BE WRONG.
I REALISE SOME RESPONSE
G NECESSARY. BUT I HOPE THIS MAY BE LIMITED IN THE LONG TERM INTER- CTS
OF HG TO SOMETHING (E G, ACTION AGAINST # C# A) WHICH
SHOULD NOT SERIOUSLY AFFECT OUR EFFICIENCY.
HOPSON
SENT AT 17122/24 HAY
RCCD AT 18072/24 MAY
Cypher
CONFIDENT IAL
OUTWARD TELEGRAM
FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
TO HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
140
Sent 24 May, 1967. 1950Z
CONFIDENTIAL
No. 1029.
123
Following telegram of 23 May from Tamsui addressed
to Foreign Office No. 21 repeated for information to Political Adviser
Hong Kong No. 7, Peking and Washington.
Begina.
General themes of local press comment on recent events in Hong Kong have
been:-
(1)
(11)
Britain is paying the penalty for having perpetually bowed and scraped
to Peking since 1950;
the authorities in Hong Kong are standing firm and will not cower before
pressure from Peking as did Portuguese in Macao. Nevertheless they have
been too lenient and should get tougher with rioters;
(iii) pro-Nationalist in Hong Kong should offer large scale
resistance to rioters.
2. There has been much speculation here that disturbances will result
in flight of capital and trained workers to Formosa but although
Nationalists would no doubt welcome this, "Government" sources have
denied they will entice them away.
3. Sub-paragraph ↑(111) is unlikely to represent views of Nationalist
leaders here. My information from (group undecypherable) sources is that
leaders advocate restraint and non-involvement by their supporters in
Hong Kong and are encouraging them to co-operate with the authorities.
This attitude would almost certainly change if it were thought that Her
Majesty's Government were likely to reach some form of settlement
resulting in suppression of nationalist organisations in the Colony.
UST
Distribution H.K.W.I.D. 'C'
123
CONFIDENTIAL
pp.
Ends.
F
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.63
+
リ
HWA 1/17
KOWLOON DISTURBANCES
APRIL/HAY, 1967.
141
The origin of the disturbances was astrictly industrial in charactor and
datos back to a 1bour disputo,which arose during the wook ending 6th ny,
in two factories (ono, in long kong and ono in Kowloon) belonging to an
artificial flower factory. The dispute arose as the result of the
introcastion by the managanent, during April, of revised shift
arrangements and new method of calculating wagon in the injection
moulding dopartnonta of the two factorios in question. The total number
of workers affected was 264 in the Hong Kong factory and 394
in the Kowloon factory. Discussions are understoo: to have taken place
between the management and the workers' reprecant tives but no agreement
was reached. The procize issues discussed are not known. The following
ia a diary of events.
29th April
The oxistence of the disputo was first notified to the Labour
Department by the managemont. The manager then reported that owing to
the obstructive attitude of the workers ho had closed the moulding
departzent of the Kowloon factory and had dismissed all the workors on
the 28th April. The closure of the moulding departant in the Hong
Kong factory appeared imminent to the management who also reported that
workers' reprosentativos had failed to attend a meeting arranged for
a discussion of the issuos in dispute.
lat May
مملم
The management reported to the labour repartɔent that all moulding
workora hail beeli urskilyrðd in the 29th April 2nd indicated that they
were opposed to any intervention by the Labour Department to arrango
joint discussions.
3rd May
The Labour Departsont made daily attempts to make contact with the llong
Kong and Kowloon Labour and Plastic Workers' Union (Loft-wing) but these
approaches were avoided by the Union until the 6th lay when the Chairman
doclined Labour Department assistanco and indicated that direct talks at
the factory were all that was required. Concurrent approaches to the
menagoment net with a similar response. The managemont made arrangements
to pay off all the dismissed workers: about 20 1:ong Kong workers and
170 Kowloon workers, believed to bo left-wing or sympathetio did not