1128
RECEMODDIN
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HIWA '//
CONFIDENTIAL.
ADDRESSED TO PEKING TELEGRAM NO 385 OF 23 MAY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION
TO HONG KONG WASHINGTON AND POLAD SINGAPORE.
HONG KONG,
!
THE CHINESE ACTING CHARGE D'AFFAIRES CALLED AT HIS OWN REQUEST AT 11 AM.
ON 23 MAY TO MAKE AN ORAL DEMARCHE ABOUT HONG KONG.
HE WAS SEEN BY MR RODGERS.
2.
THE CHARGE REFERRED TO HIS MEETING ON 19 MAY WITH THE SECRETARY OF
STATE AND SAID THAT HE HAD NOT ON THAT OCCASION HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO
REFUTE MR BROWN'S QUOTE SHAMEFUL IMPERIALIST LANGUAGE UNQUOTE. IN
ADDITION MR BROWN HAD ON 22 MAY (PRESUMABLY ON BBC PANORAMA) QUOTE
VICIOUSLY ATTACKED THE CHINESE PEOPLE UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT LARGE SCALE
QUOTE FASCIST ATROCITIES UNQUOTE
IN HONG KONG WERE THE DIRECT RESULT OF COLLUSION WITH U.S.
AND CHIANG CLIQUE AND REFERRED TO THE QUOTE BEATING UP AND
ARRESTING OF CHINESE COMPATRIOTS UNQUOTE AND QUOTE SANGUINARY
SUPPRESSION UNQUOTE. THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT RESOLUTELY BACKED THE
JUST ACTION OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG AND STOOD BEHIND THEM.
3. THE CHARGE THEN SAID THAT H.M.G. HAD NOT ONLY FAILED TO REPLY TO THE
FIVE CHINESE DEMANDS BUT HAD ALLOWED THE SITUATION TO GO FROM BAD TO
WORSE. HE DEMANDED THAT:
(A) PERSECUTION IN HONG KONG SHOULD CEASE:
(B) H.M.G. SHOULD IMMEDIATELY ACCEPT THE FIVE QUOTE SOLEMN AND JUST
UNQUOTE CHINESE DEMANDS.
(C) H.M.G. SHOULD MAKE AN IMMEDIATE REPLY.
4.
HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT CHINA WAS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE
STRUGGLE. H.M.G. WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE SERIOUS
/ CONSEQUENCES
CONFIDENTIAL
рабо
CONFIDENTIAL
FOREIGN OFFICE TELEGRAM NO. 385 TO PEKING
CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS.
-2-
5. MR RODGERS SAID THAT HE WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE CHARGE SHOULD TALK
SUCH ARROGANT NONSENSE. HE CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE CHINESE
ALLEGATIONS ABOUT HONG KONG AND SAID THE LANGUAGE IN WHICH THEY WERE
COUCHED AND THE REMARKS ABOUT THE SECRETARY OF STATE WERE COMPLETELY
UNACCEPTABLE. IF THE CHINESE HAD A NOTE TO LEAVE IN THESE TERMS IT WOULD
NOT BE ACCEPTED. WE WERE ALWAYS READY TO DISCUSS WITH THE CHINESE
MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN BUT NO DISCUSSIONS WERE POSSIBLE IF THE
CHINESE USED THE LANGUAGE NOT OF DIPLOMACY BUT OF PROPAGANDA.
SOSFA SENT 16542 23 MAY 1967
FO/CO/WH.DISTRIBUTION
F.E.D.
CONFIDENTIAL
SENT TO HONG KONG AS COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (D.T.D.) TELEGBAN
NO.
•1015
#
129
CONFIDENTIAL
Cypher/Cat A
FLASH PEKING TO FOREIGN OFFICE
Telno 560 24 May, 1967
CONFIDENTIAL
Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.560 of 24 May, Repeated for
information to Hong Kong, Singapore and Washington.
Your telegram No.386:
Following for de la Mare.
I am strongly in favour of taking some retaliatory action. The problem
is to find some thing which will not lead to escalation in diplomatic
warfare and increase our difficulties here. Visas are a case in point.
We have just applied for visas for two extra wireless operators from
Singapore so that we can keep twenty four hour watch here. Our own
operators are under great pressure and it is important that we get the
extra hands, though the Chinese may refuse or delay in any case.
2.
I agree that N.C.N.A. is the best target. Perhaps we should take a leaf
out of the Chinese book. They recently expelled three Soviet
correspondents, allowing three others to remain, because they have only
three N.C.N.A. men in Moscow. We could therefore as a gesture reduce the
London N.C.N.A. staff from eight to say four. This should leave the one
Reuters staff man undisturbed here on a basis of reciprocity.
3.
If this were agreed I hope it would be possible to
A method
allow the deporting men reasonable time to leave. the Chinese have also
used here is to refuse to renew residence permits when these expire. I
do not know the position in London, i.e., how often permits have to be
renewed, but if some of the N.C.N.A. permits are due to come up for
renewal soon, it might be possible to deal with them on that basis. On
the other hand you may feel that this is not drastic enough, though we
could issue a strong statement immediately announcing our decision to
reduce the N.C.N.A. staff for all the relevant reasons, specifying four
individuals whose residence permits will not be renewed on expiry and
for whom we will not repeat not admit replacements. The Chinese Charge
would presumably be informed of this decision before publication of
statement.
4.
Alternatively we could do something to N.C.N.A. in
Hong Kong, subject to the views of the Governor.
5.
I realise that this would not amount to a very grand gesture of
retaliation, but it could be dressed up in the statement to appear more
than it really is. I fear the closing of the N.C.N.A. office and
expulsion of all its staff would in present circumstances not only lead
to expulsion of Reuters
CONFIDENTIAL
/but risk
PARO
CONFIDENTIAL
Peking telegram No.560 to Foreign Office.
-2-
but risk action against my staff too. Peters, for example, after his
incident at Canton would be vulnerable.
6.
Grateful for warning if action is going to be taken.
Foreign Office please pass Washington routine 286.
Mr. Hopson
Sent 02552/24 May Recd 0537Z/24 Nay
[Repeated as requested]
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STRIELYGAT A
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TELNO $62
SECRET.
TO FOREIGN OFFICE
24 WY 1907
(2)
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(9
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Amer
SD cilen 小
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ADDRESSED TO FO TEL NO 502 of 24 HAY DEPTD FOR IP TO HONG KONG.
MY TELEGRAM NO 499.
*
K'AO HSIAO HS1 OF 20 MAY CAR
RIES A F P REPORT OF 17/MAY OF
GUILALTH OFFICE STATEMENT ON HON.
VG KONG AS II, :
ELL US NEV
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REALIG REPORT OF 18 HAY CN CH'EN YI'S AVOIDANCE OF ME AT THE
RWEGIAN NATION
AL DAY AND HY ORAL PROTEST TO LO XUDI PO. ISSUE
C2 27 MAY CZARIES NO HONG KONG NEWS.
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GRAT 2. ILOVE OF 23
PAY GIVES FRONT PAGE COVE4-05-20-407991-NDUS49"DIS
NO WAY OF YOUR PROTEST TO SIEN FING. IT ALSO REPORTO GALSUCKTHY'S
BOL IN HONG K
·ONG FOR QUOTE SECRET TALKS INQUOTE WITH GOVERNOR
AND GIVES EXCERPTS FROM HIS STATEMENT ON ARRIVAL. THE RISING PRICE
OF
SELDİ İN
CELDȚIN HONG KOja IS ALSO MENTIONED.
55
HOPSON SENT AT O7307/24 Y
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RECEIVED IN F.O. BY
TELEPRINTER AT............................
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+
ADDSD TO FO TEL NO 561 OF 24 MAY RFI TO HONGKING (FLASH)
POLAD SPORE AND WTON
REPEAL
NCNA REPORT DATOLINED HONGKONG 23 HAY PUBLISHED IN TODAYS.
+
PEOPLES DAILY STATES. THAT ON 22 MAY QUOTE AT LEAST TWO
ייך
HUNDRED COMPATRIOTS WERE KILLED, OR: SEVERELY, INJURED UNQUOTE
IN HONGKONG AND KOWLOON.
2. THIS BLATANTLY INFLAMMATORY DISTORTION, OF. THE FACTS
WILL CERTAINLY LEAD TO RENEWED DEMONSTRATIONS. HERE.. IN
1
· FACT AS. I WRITE ONE HAS JUST BEGUN,
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Mh Hopson.
Fo/co/wh.D
NNNN
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FED.
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REF.
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152
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P.S. P.U.S.
3.S.
Шальнов
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FE
ས་ས་་་་་
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Cypher
(132
12 1
1967
2
3
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (The Secretary of State)
24 MAI
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
D. 24 May 1967
R. 24
It
04352
"
PRIORITY SECRET No.680
For Garner from Galsworthy.
Your telegram No.1000.
せ
(117
I am sending later today three telegrams
containing
(a)
(b)
(c)
our analysis and appreciation of situation;
summary of measures already adopted by Hong Kong Government to deal with
situation;
recommendations concerning further measures which may have to be taken.
2. These telegrams are being prepared in close consultation with
Governor and C.B.F. and are endorsed by Bolland.
Distribution
-
FILES
-
117
1357136
H.K.W.I.D.'C'
SECRET
RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES - $3
+
2 4MAL1907
HWN1/1
CONFIDENTIAL
133
CORY FOR REGISTRATION
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
MAY
12 1
1967
RECEIVED IN
Cypher
D. 24 May 1967
1+ R. 24
ARCHIVES No. 63
04402.
2
4MẨY 1967
IMMEDIATE
CONFIDENTIAL
No.682
HOD 1/17
Addressed to Commonwealth Office
זו
Repeated Peking No.256
I
** POLAD Singapore No.1 24 "Washington No.135
(S. of S. please pass IMMEDIATE to all)
Foreign Office telegram to Peking No.386.
As seen from here, closure of N.C.N.A. in London
is likely to have following repercussions on Hong Kong situation.
2. One of our main purposes here is to keep down tension and, unless we
are forced to take a specific step to meet the internal security
situation in Hong Kong, to avoid anything which might lead to greater
involvement by Peking. While we see the value of closing the N.C.N.A. in
London as a retaliation against Shanghai, our fear is that Chinese will
regard it also in Hong Kong context and increase their pressures here
30 Further, if we were to close N.C.N.A. in London but not to close them
in Hong Kong, not only Peking but also opinion here (both Communist and
non-Communist) might well regard it as an admission on our part that we
did not dare to take this action here. Fact that N.C.N.A. is engaging in
even more poisonous propaganda and activities here than in Britain would
emphasise the point even more. But we would regard closing of N.C.N.A.
in Hong Kong as a major escalation which we think would inevitably
provoke a strong response from Peking affecting the Colony.
4. In the interests of Hong Kong therefore I would feel much happier if
you could avoid taking such a step.
(Passed as requested with advance copies.
for Foreign Office F.E. Dept.)
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CONFIDENTIAL
197
раво
/Mr.Wilson
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
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Mr. Henn
Major Koe
En Clair
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7
PRIORITY RAWALPINDI TO COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
COMMON
Mr. Har 134
Hall
Эт) дост
Telno 516
UNCLASSIFIED
24 May 1967
нени
to have
fot this
24/5
Addressed to Commonwealth Office telegram No. 516 of 24 May. Repeated
for information to Delhi and Washington.
Defence Minister.
It was announced on 21 May that Vice--Admiral A.R. Khan, Pakistan
Defence Minister, will visit China at the invitation of the Chinese
Government, for a week from 25 May. He will be accompanied by S. M.
Yusuf, Foreign Secretary.
Sir C. Pickard
Sent 0740Z 24 May
Recd 09182 24 May
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22233
LAST
REF.
вата
SECRET
INWARD TELEGRAM
TO THE COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
(The Secretary of State)
1
FROM HONG KONG (Sir D. Trench)
Cypher
D.
24 May, 1967. R. 24 "
13002.
FLASH
SECRET
No. 688.
135
RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 63
25 MA
1
MAY
Addressed to Commonwealth office. Repeated
IT
"Peking No. 261.
" POLAD Singapore No. 126. "Washington No. 137. (Please repeat
PRIORITY to all).
132
.967
My telegram No. 680 (not repeated).
Following from Galsworthy.
Following is our analysis and appreciation.
In the present state of overspill from the Cultural Revolution and given
the Chinese propensity at this time for irrationality, we cannot be sure
what are China's intentionE towards Hong Kong or how they will react to
any given situation. With this reservation, as seen from here it does
not look as though Peking intends at present to force us out of Hong
Kong. Our assessment is rather that the local Communiste felt that they
must act here increasingly in accordance with the principles of the
Cultural Revolution (one of the "sins" of the Hong Kong Government is
that it had "limited" the effects of the Cultural Revolution in Hong
Kong), and accordingly seized the incident at, inter alia, the
artificial flower factory as a suitable opportunity for doing so. This
seems to have been a mistaken initiative by the local Communists,
representing their response to their understanding of current trends of
thought in China, rather than a policy deliberately directed from
authoritative mainland sources. But once the local communists had
committed themselves, Peking, on the basis of misleading reports of the
local situation, felt not only that tho.. must react in support, but
also that they could exploit the situation in order at least to
humiliate us to such an extent as to ensure that in future we would be
much more quickly sensitive to Peking pressure (e.g. over U.S.
warships), and if possible to force us to accept a Macao-type situation.
2. This situation is therefore essentially political. Although it arose
from a genuine labour dispute, it could as easily have arisen from any
other incident involving the Authorities here. From the c. teet the
original labour dispute was taken over and exploited by the Communist
press and organisations, Although the management, belatedly, sought the
assistance of the Commissioner of Labour in settling the dispute, the
Communists rejected his efforts, maintaining as a matter of principle
that the Government has no status or role to play in labour matters.
SECRET
132
757
SECRET
*
3. The local Communists seem to have misjudged the temper of the
general public in Hong Kong, which has shown itself strongly opposed to
the imposition of a Macao-type situation on Hong Kong, and, with
Government encouragement, has been surprisingly out-spoken in its
support for Goverment's measures to frustrate Communist pressures and
maintain law and order, There is evidence that the Communists (both
local and mainland) have been taken aback by the strngth of public
opposition. After their earlier demonstrations in Kowloon had incurred
much public odium because hoolganism was encouraged and took over, they
switched to the Macao pattern of endeavouring to humiliate the Governor
within Government House. When this failed, they resorted to fomenting
disorders in the central district of Victoria, encouraged by venomous
inflammatory loudspeakers, principally from the Peking-owned Bank of
China. In the face of firm police action and public disapprobation,
these tactics ceased on Tuesday 23 May, which appears to have been a day
of reappraisal by the Communists. Today 24 May the emphasis is on a
number of stoppages (unrelated to any industrial dispute) in the bus and
tram services. So far this action has been reasonably orderly; but there
is evidence of strong feeling amongst several Communist unions that more
violent
methods should be used in order to create incidents which can be
exploited.
40 On the other hand there are indications of some disillusionment and
disagreement in the local Communist leadership; some are reported to be
feeling that they have to some extent blundered by exposing themselves
too early, by misjudging public reaction, and by underestimating the
efficacy of Government's response.
5. If however Communists decide to press their campaign vigorously,
their most likely tactics seem to be:-
(a) Engineering stoppages in public utilities, Government
Departments, etc., accompanied by intimidation on a considerable scale.
(b) Provoking the police by fresh and more violent
riotous demonstrations using women and children as a screen (as in
Macao).
(c) Maintaining a general atmosphere of tension, e.g. by use of
loudspeakers, poster and press campaigns, intimidation by telephone and
letter, spreading
rumours, and propagandist Red Guard style demonstrations on the
frontier. (d) Attempting by all available means to subvert and intimi-
date the police, and over-stretch their resources.
(e) Assaulting exposed Europeans and well-disposed Chinese.
فرة
The kind of situation envisaged in paragraph 5 above, if it were
vigorously sustained over a period of, say, two to four weeks could lead
to the exhaustion of the police and of the troops, who in these
circumstances would of necessity have been called in (they have not been
yet). Before this point was reached, over-extension of the security
forces would require them to be used in smaller numbers at each
incident; they would then have to use greater force to restore the
situation; this would cause mounting casualties and loss of life, and
hence a vicious spiral of exacerbation.
SECRET
SECRET
The
7. This raises the question whether the local Communists are capable
of sustained and vigorous enough action to over- extend and exhaust the
security forces.
By themselves
they probably are not. But the perennial danger especially in Kowloon
and parts of Hong Kong Ialand, is that any rumpus draws a crowd, and any
crowd can quickly become a mob. Communists have in fact used this
technique already (paragraph 3) and could revert to it again. If they
did so systematically and on a wide scale, we would need to take very
tough measures to avoid being swamped.
до
To deal successfully with all this, it will be crucial to
maintain general public confidence (which task will get more difficult
the longer the crisis lasts), and particularly the confidence and morale
of the police. We must continue to show firmness and steadiness here,
backed by reaffirmations of H.M.G.'s support for the Hong Kong
Government's measures (this latter is vital). We must strive to retain
the initiative in Hong Kong, which we have now secured, to help to show
that public confidence in us is not misplaced. We must be prepared to
counter-attack selectively, taking care to avoid so far as possible
direct challenges to the Peking Government of a sort that would oblige
them to intervene more actively.
(Passed as requested with advance copy.
for Sir Saville Garner and to F.E.D.)
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